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ABSTRACT 
Will Analysts Learn From Other Analysts 
Who Possess Superior Private Information? 
by 
SHI Hangyuan 
Master of Philosophy 
Based on a valuable testing venue in China where listed companies are required to 
disclose corporate site visit records of financial analyst to the public, this study 
examines whether analysts will learn from visiting analysts' forecasts that contain 
superior private information. I find that visiting forecasts tend to attract more 
analysts to issue forecasts in their aftermath than the prior forecasts issued by the 
same analysts but without conducting corporate site visit (non-visiting forecasts). 
The following effect is weaker when the visiting forecasts are more informative. In 
addition, other analysts’ forecasts following the visiting forecasts tend to move closer 
to the visiting forecasts than the forecasts following the non-visiting forecasts, with 
the effects being stronger for more informative visiting forecasts. Furthermore, 
followers experience a greater improvement in their forecast accuracy than the 
non-followers. This effect is also stronger when the visiting forecasts are more 
informative. Last but not the least, I find a decline in analyst forecast dispersion, an 
increase in common information, and an improvement in forecast accuracy in the 
period subsequent to the issuance of visiting analysts’ forecasts but no such effect for 
non-visiting forecasts. Collectively, the results suggest that analysts have incentive to 
learn from the forecasts that contain superior information and such learning activities 
tend to improve the information environment of the visiting firms. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
It has been long documented that some analysts tend to follow other analysts to issue 
forecasts even though brokerage houses and analysts can benefit from early forecasts 
as it tends to associate with increased trading volume and commissions (e.g., Cooper 
et al., 2001; Irvine, 2004; Jackson, 2005).  
 
The following behaviors of analysts can be independent actions taken by analysts in 
response to common information shocks (Clement et al., 2011; Schrand et al., 2014). 
They can also be the results of social behaviors engaged by analysts including 
herding (Trueman, 1994; Graham, 1999; Hong et al., 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005; 
Beyer et al., 2010) and learning (Cooper et al., 2001; Clement et al., 2011; Schrand et 
al., 2014). 
 
On the social behaviors, existing studies focus primarily on analysts' herding 
behavior, which involves analysts imitating the forecasts of other analysts by 
following some traits of other analysts (such as experience or ability) (Hong et al., 
2000; Clement and Tse, 2005). Much fewer studies have been conducted on analysts' 
learning behavior, which involves analysts actively processing and incorporating 
others' information into their own forecasts (Greve, 2011). This gap in the literature 
is particularly intriguing, as learning is a well-documented human tendency in the 
psychology literature (Asch, 1952; Bandura 1963; Miller 2011). The scarcity of 
research on this important issue is probably due to the difficulty in identifying the 
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information set possessed by different analysts. As a result, it is particularly 
challenging for scholars to identify which analyst has superior private information 
and examine the subsequent information flow among analysts.  
 
In this study, I make use of a useful setting in China to investigate whether analysts 
would learn from forecasts issued by other analysts who have superior private 
information regarding the forecasting firms. Specifically, the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) has required the listed firms in China to disclose the record of 
visiting financial analysts to the public from late 20061. Corporate site visit allows 
analysts to observe the operation of the visiting firms and have private discussions 
with management (Soltes 2014). Previous research has documented that the forecasts 
issued by the visiting analysts after the site visits contain superior private information 
(Cheng et al., 2015b). Using the corporate site visit data in China, Cheng et al. 
(2015a) find the significant market reaction in the 3-day window centered on site 
visits and conclude that site visit serves as an important type of information 
acquisition event for analysts. These two studies confirm that corporate site visits 
allow the visiting analysts to obtain relevant and more accurate information 
regarding the earnings of the visiting firms. The disclosure of corporate site visits 
therefore effectively reveals the superior private information possessed by the 
visiting analysts and offers a valuable setting to examine whether analysts who have 
                                                             
1 There are two stock exchanges in China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE). SHSE and SZSE has a total market cap of RMB 14.84 trillion and RMB 
8.79 trillion respectively by the end of 2013.  
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not visited the firms (hereafter non-visiting analysts) will learn from the forecasts 
issued by the visiting analysts (hereafter visiting forecasts)2. 
 
I focus on non-visiting analysts' forecasts issued in the period subsequent to visiting 
forecasts within a 30 days window to discern the possibility of the occurrence of 
learning behaviors of non-visiting analysts. Such a focus may underestimate the 
extent of learning that has occurred as some non-visiting analysts may learn from the 
visiting forecasts but choose not to issue a forecast during my specified period. Some 
analysts may also learn from the visiting forecasts and incorporate the information 
into their forecasts regarding the earnings of other firms (due to intra-industry 
information transfer) rather than the forecasts regarding the visiting firms. 
Nevertheless, the forecasts issued by non-visiting analysts are observable and 
measurable outcome of learning. Focusing on the outcome in the immediate 
aftermath of the visiting forecasts can mitigate the influence of other information. If I 
could still find evidence for the occurrence of learning by this sub-set of learning 
behaviors, I would conclude with greater confidence that the visiting forecasts have 
indeed induced learning among analysts.  
 
As analysts may issue following forecasts independently or due to herding behaviors 
                                                             
2 Cheng et al. (2015a) argues that other individuals could get to know the occurrence of site visit 
through the so-called “expert network”. Their evidence of significant market reaction around site visit 
event further confirms the existence of such a network as the stock price movement surrounding site 
visit is related to the information content of site visits. In addition, visiting analysts may mention their 
site visit experiences in their analyst reports. Finally, from late 2012, SZSE requires firms to disclose 
visiting analyst records in two working days after the visiting event, which officially disclose the 
occurrence of visiting event in a timely manner. 
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rather than learning induced by the private information contained in the visiting 
forecasts, I employ a difference-in-difference approach (DID) to discern the learning 
effect. Specifically, I hold the visiting analysts-firm pair constant and compare two 
groups of following forecasts, the following forecasts of the visiting forecast that 
contain superior private information and the following forecasts of the prior 
non-visiting forecast that contains no obvious private information. Holding the 
analyst-firm pair constant helps to mitigate the confounding effects associated with 
the tendency of analysts to herd to a particular analyst and/or a particular firm. If we 
further assume that the distribution and the behavior of analysts who issue forecasts 
independently are more or less the same for both the visiting and non-visiting 
forecasts, the differences between the following forecasts of visiting forecasts and 
the following forecast of the non-visiting forecasts can reasonably be attributed to the 
incentive to learn as induced by the private information contained in the visiting 
forecasts3. 
 
I conduct four major set of tests to examine whether the visiting forecasts have 
induced the learning behavior of non-visiting analysts. The first set of tests compares 
the number of analysts who issue a forecast within 30 days after the issuance of the 
                                                             
3 Some might argue that in order to have a true difference-in-difference (DID), a control sample 
during the same time period without corporate visit and visiting forecast is more appropriate given the 
dynamic nature of Chinese stock market. The difference obtained from the control group can further 
filter out the changes in forecasting behaviors of analysts over time (happened to both treated and 
control group at the same time). To do this, I need to find a control group that matches both analyst 
and form characteristics. However, it is extremely difficult to find such matches. More importantly, 
my study focuses on the analysts’ forecasts issued during 6 months (at most) prior to the visiting 
forecast. Results obtained from such a short window are less likely to be driven by major structural 
changes in the Chinese stock market. 
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visiting forecasts with the corresponding number of followers for the non-visiting 
forecasts. Consistent with the notion that visiting forecasts induce learning activities, 
I find that visiting forecasts tend to attract more analysts to issue forecasts in their 
aftermath than non-visiting forecasts. Moreover, I examine whether the change in the 
number of followers between the visiting and non-visiting forecasts are associated 
with the amount of relevant and accurate information regarding the earnings of the 
visiting firms. I find a significant negative relation between the informativeness of 
the visiting forecasts and the change in the number of followers. The result suggests 
that more informative visiting forecasts discourage other analysts from issuing 
following forecasts. A plausible explanation is that more informative visiting 
forecasts reduce the possibility for other analysts to bring in additional information 
and/or insight regarding the visiting firm and thus reduce their incentive to issue 
following forecast. 
 
My second set of tests examines how the visiting forecasts influence the content of 
the following forecasts. To capture such inter-analyst influence, I utilize a method 
developed by Cohn and Juergens (2014). Specifically, the method involves the 
calculation of the difference between the visiting analysts forecast and the following 
analyst’s most recent prior forecast, and then computes the fraction of this “gap” 
closed by the following analyst’s subsequent revision. I find that the followers of the 
visiting forecasts close the “gap” to a greater extent than the followers of the 
non-visiting forecasts. Furthermore, the more informative the visiting forecasts, the 
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greater the “gap” that has been closed. The results indicate that the followers are 
more willing to incorporate the information contained in the visiting forecasts into 
their own forecasts if the visiting forecasts contain more useful information. The 
significant relation between the informativeness of the visiting forecasts and the 
forecasts of the followers suggests that the forecasts of the followers involve active 
processing of the information contained in the visiting forecasts.  
 
In addition to the “gap” closed, my third set of tests examines the accuracy of the 
following forecasts in order to provide more evidence on the learning effectiveness 
of non-visiting analysts'. Specifically, I compare the change in accuracy between 
non-visiting analysts who have issued their forecasts before (non-followers) and 
non-visiting analysts who have issued their forecasts after the issuance of the visiting 
forecasts (followers). If the followers of visiting forecasts do learn from the visiting 
forecasts and incorporate the useful information contained in the visiting forecasts, 
they should experience a greater improvement in forecast accuracy relative to the 
non-followers. The results are consistent with my prediction. Furthermore, I find that 
the improvement in forecast accuracy of the following forecast of visiting forecast is 
more pronounced when the visiting forecast is more informative. The result also 
suggests that the followers of the visiting forecasts do actively process the 
information contained in the visiting forecasts and incorporate that information into 
their own forecasts. 
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Last but not least, I also examine how the learning of non-visiting analysts affects the 
information environment of the visiting firms. I use three firm-level information 
environment measures, analyst forecast dispersion, common information, and 
accuracy of consensus forecast to examine the impact of learning.  
 
Analyst forecast dispersion has been widely used to measure firm information 
environment (Heflin et al., 2003, Byard et al., 2010). Higher forecast dispersion 
indicates the existence of a larger disagreement among analyst. If the following 
analysts do learn from the visiting forecasts, we should expect a decrease in analyst 
forecast dispersion since the following analysts are simultaneously influenced by the 
same visiting forecast. Consistent with my expectation, I find that the forecast 
dispersion decreases in the period subsequent to the visiting forecasts. Furthermore, 
there is no statistically significant change in forecast dispersion for the non-visiting 
forecasts.  
 
Barron et al. (1998) suggest that forecast dispersion of analysts contains both 
common and private information. If following analysts do learn from the same 
visiting forecasts, we should expect to see an increase in common information in the 
period subsequent to the visiting forecasts. Consistent with my expectation, I find 
that the common information increases in the period subsequent to the visiting 
forecasts. For the non-visiting forecasts, I do not find any statistically significant 
change in common information. 
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Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggest that firms with better disclosure quality tend to 
have lower analyst forecast errors. Horton et al. (2013) find that the consensus 
forecast errors decrease for firms that mandatorily adopt IFRS relative to forecast 
errors of other firms. Similar to the prior literature, I also view an improvement in 
forecast accuracy as an indicator of better information environment. If following 
analysts do benefit from the visiting forecasts, which contain useful information, I 
expect to see an improvement in forecast accuracy in the period subsequent to the 
visiting forecasts. Consistent with my expectation, I find that the accuracy of 
consensus forecast improves in the period subsequent to the visiting forecast while I 
do not find any significant change for the non-visiting forecasts. 
 
My study offers systematic evidence on whether analysts will learn from other 
analysts' who possess superior private information. Unlike the vast literature on 
analysts' herding behaviors, only a few studies have examined the learning activities 
of analysts. The few existing studies tend to focus on how analysts learn from the 
commonly available information rather than the private information of other analysts 
(Clement et al., 2011; Schrand et al., 2014). The gap in the literature is probably 
because it is very difficult to identify the private information possessed by different 
analysts. Nevertheless, learning from others' superior private information and 
knowledge is an equally important, if not more important, aspect of human learning 
activities. My study fills this gap in the literature and helps to offer a more 
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comprehensive understanding of analysts' learning activities.  
 
In a broader sense, my study also contributes to a better understanding of how 
analysts produce earnings forecasts. Focusing on how superior private information is 
transferred from one analyst to another analyst via learning activities of analysts, my 
study highlights the inter-analysts information flow as a determinant of the frequency 
and quality of analyst forecasts. Furthermore, to the extent that analyst forecasts can 
shape investors' behaviors, studies on analysts' learning behaviors can also contribute 
to an understanding of the information diffusion in financial markets.  
 
In addition to academic value, my study also has practical a regulatory implication. 
My findings suggest that requiring listed firms to disclose the records of private 
communication with analysts may help to reveal the private information possessed 
by analysts. The revelation of the information source can consequently induce 
learning activities among analysts, which helps to improve the quality of analysts' 
forecasts as well as the overall information environment of firms. 
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Chapter 2. Research Background 
 
Prior studies have found that some analysts tend to follow other analysts to issue 
forecasts, although a timely forecast can trigger greater trading volume and increased 
commissions, which can benefit both brokerage firms and analysts (e.g., Cooper et 
al., 2001; Irvine, 2004; Jackson, 2005). While the following behaviors can be a result 
of independent actions of analyst without involving any connection between the 
leading and following analysts, previous research has proposed two social behaviors, 
namely herding and learning, that can explain why some analysts intentionally 
follow others to issue earnings forecasts. 
 
In this chapter, I first briefly review the literature on herding behaviors of analysts. I 
will then review the existing studies on learning as well as the studies on corporate 
site visit as an important information acquisition event for analysts. Lastly, I will 
briefly discuss the institutional background on corporate site visit in China. 
 
2.1. Herding of financial analysts 
Herding refers to the tendency of following others based on a variety of decision 
rules including “follow similar others”, “follow high status” or “follow the majority” 
(Banerjee, 1992). The phenomenon of herding was first studied in psychology. For 
example, Asch (1952) studied the relation between social environments and 
individual’s decision behavior and observed that individuals often abandon their 
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private signal to rely predominantly on group opinion.  
 
Early finance study describes herding as imitation behavior and often leads to 
inefficient outcomes for the financial market as a whole. One of the undesirable 
outcomes of herding is that it leads to the suboptimal use of valuable information and 
result in inefficient decision making (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Keynes (1936) 
suggests that professional managers will "follow the herd" if they are concerned 
about how others will assess their ability to make sound judgments. Scharfsterin and 
Stein (1990) study the forces that can lead to herd behavior. They develop a 
“learning” model and show that under certain circumstances, managers simply mimic 
the investment decisions of other managers, ignoring substantive private information. 
Trueman (1994) also suggest that analysts exhibit herding behavior, whereby they 
release forecasts similar to those previously announced by other analysts, even when 
their information does not justify this. 
 
The vast literature on the herding behavior of financial analysts focuses primarily on 
how different analysts’ incentives and characteristics are associated with the 
tendency to herd. Scharfstein & Stein (1990), Trueman (1994) argue that analysts 
manipulate their forecasts to get closer to the consensus in order to signal that their 
information correlates with their peers. The principal idea is that to fail as a group 
will not harm one’s reputation as much as being mistaken on one’s own. Collective 
failure may be attributable to uncertainty in the environment. Hong et al. (2000) find 
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the consistent evidence that less experienced analysts are more concerned about their 
reputations and, therefore, tend to herd more frequently. Clement and Tse (2005) 
further demonstrate that analysts with more experience, high prior forecast accuracy, 
less number of industry coverage, and from larger brokerage firm are less likely to 
herd. 
 
2.2. Learning of financial analysts 
The basic assumption of the herding models is that “the action rather than 
information that is visible to the public (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch 1992). 
Herders imitate other people's actions on the basis of the inferred information rather 
than other people's actual information. Welch (2000) argues that analysts will be 
more likely to herd when there is little information. In contrast to herding, learning 
should involve direct possessing and incorporating of others' useful information into 
one's own decision (Greve, 2011). Although learning is a well-documented human 
tendency in the psychology literature (Asch 1952; Bandura, 1963), empirical studies 
on analysts' learning activities are particularly scarce.  
 
Theoretically, Chen (2007) suggests that analysts tend to decide the timing of their 
forecasts strategically. Two major predictions of the model are (1) analyst will tend 
to forecast later if he has a better ex ante reputation, and (2) he will tend to forecast 
earlier if the quality of public information is lower. Guttman (2010) develops a 
model that endogenizes the timing decision of analysts and analyzes their 
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equilibrium timing strategies. Its tradeoff theory considers the dimension of active 
learning—a benefit of waiting. He concludes that analysts with a higher precision of 
initial private information tend to forecast earlier, and analysts with higher learning 
ability tend to forecast later in order to learn from the preceding forecasts that have 
been issued by other analysts. 
 
Although theoretical studies suggest some rationales for an analyst to learn from 
other analysts, empirical evidence on analysts’ learning activities remains scarce. 
Clement et al. (2011) use earnings announcement as a common information shock 
and examine the timing of issuing a forecast. They examine how analysts issue 
forecast based on two signals, stock returns and other analysts’ forecast. Using a 
sample of 275,328 analysts from 1996 to 2005, their study shows that most analysts 
quickly revise their forecasts after earnings announcement and their revisions are not 
only correlated with their own forecast errors, but also with announcement period 
returns and the average revision of the analysts who precede them. The more 
informative returns and the average revision are, the more analysts’ own earnings 
forecast revisions are correlated with these two signals. Moreover, analysts who are 
most sensitive to a signal’s informativeness tend to demonstrate superior forecast 
accuracy and investors respond strongly to the forecast revisions of analysts who 
demonstrate this ability. Their results suggest that observing and learning from stock 
prices and consensus forecast serve as one source of analyst expertise and the market 
does recognize the importance of this type learning. 
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Schrand et al. (2014) investigate information diffusion after earnings announcement 
by examining analysts’ forecast decision. Using analyst forecast data from 1994 to 
2011, they study the timing of analyst forecast after the earnings announcement. 
They consider three categories of factors associated with analysts’ forecast decision, 
the ease of the forecasting task, analysts’ incentives, and learning. They show that 
analyst who issues more timely forecast are associated with easier forecasting task 
and have strong incentives to issue immediately (e.g., analyst from larger brokerage 
house). 
 
The study of Clement et al. (2011) examines whether analysts will learn from the 
information commonly available in the market as reflected in the stock returns and 
average revisions of other analysts. Schrand et al. (2014) discern the learning effect 
by the timing of issuing forecasts by analysts who are responding to a common 
information shock. None of the prior studies have examined whether analysts will 
learn from other analysts who possess superior private information. This issue is 
important because people will learn not only from the common wisdom but also from 
the people who have superior private information and knowledge. Previous studies 
have demonstrated that analysts obtain private information regarding firms from 
different sources (e.g. Barter 1998; Valentine 2010; Soltes 2014). Therefore, it is 
important to examine whether analysts will learn from other analysts who possess 
superior private information and how such learning activity and how such learning 
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will influence the information environment. My study fills this gap in the literature. 
 
2.3. Corporate site visits as an important information acquisition event for 
financial analyst 
Financial analysts play a critical role in the capital market. They serve as information 
intermediaries and facilitate the communication with investors (Healy and Palepu 
2001). One important task of financial analyst is to generate research report and issue 
earnings forecasts for companies. Thus, financial analysts need to collect information 
from different channels to develop an insightful analysis of the company. They not 
only need to analyze publicly available information (e.g., macro economy data, firm 
financial data, industry report) but also need to incorporate the information they 
acquired from other channels (e.g., conference calls, meeting with management, 
company visits).  
 
Historically, the importance of private information acquisition has well been 
recognized. Barter (1998)’s semi-structured interviews reveal that analysts rate direct 
contact with the company as the most important sources of information. Analysts 
benefit substantially from meeting directly with companies as it helps them to gain 
unique insights regarding the firm’s operation and strategy (Valentine 2010). Based 
on a survey of financial analysts, Brown et al. (2015) find that company or plant 
visits are rated second most useful type of direct contact with management for the 
purpose of issuing stock recommendations. Around 50% of respondents considered 
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company or plant visits are useful for the purpose of generating earnings forecasts.  
 
Access to management remains an important source of analyst’s information 
advantage. Jung et al. (2014) study analyst’s interest, measured by the onset of 
analysts who do not cover a firm but participate on that firms’ earnings conference 
call, and conclude that analyst interest is associated with positive future earnings and 
stock returns. By using a novel dataset of analysts’ private interaction with 
management, Soltes (2014) concludes that private interaction with management is an 
important communication channel for analysts. Green et al. (2014) study 
broker-hosted investor conferences and conclude that participating analysts have 
superior access to management and obtain information from such events. Recent 
studies directly investigate the effect of corporate site events and conclude that 
corporate site visits are an important type of information acquisition activities and 
visiting analysts also improve their forecast accuracy afterward (Cheng et al., 2015a, 
Cheng et al., 2015b). In summary, previous studies suggest that analysts can obtain 
valuable private information from different types of private communications with 
firms. Therefore, it is important to examine whether other analysts will learn from 
the analysts who possess superior private information. 
 
2.4. Institutional background on corporate site visits in China 
Although corporate site visits are important information sources for analysts, firms 
are not required to disclose such information to the general public. The Shenzhen 
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Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China pilots a new scheme of fair disclosure and requires 
listed firms to disclose investor activity records to the general public starting from 
August 20064. This disclosure requirement provides a testing venue on how analysts 
incorporate important private information acquired from corporate visits into their 
earnings forecasts.  
 
The disclosure includes the date of investor activity event, the format of the event, 
the place where the event took place, participating bodies and the main topics 
discussed during the event. Site visit accounts for the majority of investor activity 
format while email exchanges, investor conference, road shows, press conference, 
sell-side broker conferences also show up occasionally. Appendix A provides an 
example of investor activity records. For this study, I only focus on the site visit 
events conducted by financial analysts and Table 1 shows the sample selection 
procedures. I exclude investor activities that are not conducted by the financial 
analyst (e.g., Feb 15 record in Appendix A) or the format of the visit is not a site visit 
(e.g., May 7 record in Appendix A). In addition, I also exclude site visit conducted 
by financial analysts who are not covered in China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database. 
 
  
                                                             
4 Cheng et al. (2015b)’s field interviews reveal that the site visits immediately following semi-annual 
and annual reports are initiated by firms while all other site visits are initiated by investors. 
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Chapter 3. Hypothesis Development and Empirical Results 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Analysts have the incentive to learn from the forecasts issued by other analysts only 
when the others' forecasts contained superior private information. In my context, 
non-visiting analysts have the incentive to learn from visiting analysts only when 
visiting analysts obtain valuable information from site visits and the forecasts issued 
by visiting analysts contain relevant and accurate information regarding the earnings 
of visiting firms. 
 
Also using the corporate site visit data in China, Cheng et al. (2015a) find the 
significant market reaction in the 3-day window centered on site visits and conclude 
that site visit serves as an important type of information acquisition activity for 
analysts. Cheng et al. (2015b) further investigate the valuable information contained 
in the visiting forecasts by examining the change in forecast accuracy between 
visiting and non-visiting forecast. They find that the improvement of forecast 
accuracy is more pronounced for visiting forecast than non-visiting forecasts, which 
supports the notion that visiting forecasts contain more relevant and accurate 
information regarding the earnings of the target firms. Therefore, visiting forecasts 
satisfy the precondition for the occurrence of learning activity among analysts and 
offer a valuable venue to test whether other non-visiting analysts will learn from 
visiting forecasts. 
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In this chapter, I conduct four major sets of analyses to discern whether and how 
non-visiting analysts will learn from the forecast issued by visiting analysts. In the 
first set of analysis, I examine whether visiting forecasts attracts more non-visiting 
analysts to issue forecasts in the period subsequent to the issuance of visiting 
forecasts than a non-visiting forecast issued by the same visiting analyst regarding 
the earnings of the same visiting firm. The second set of analysis examines whether 
the content of the following analysts has been influenced by visiting forecasts. While 
the third set of analysis investigates whether the forecasts after the issuance of the 
visiting forecasts experience larger improvement in forecast accuracy than the 
forecasts issued before the issuance of the visiting forecasts, the last set of analysis 
studies whether and how the learning activities of analysts have improved the 
information environment of the forecasting firms. 
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3.2. Followers of visiting and non-visiting forecasts 
3.2.1. Introduction  
In this section, I examine whether the visiting forecasts issued by visiting analysts 
have induced more analysts to issue forecasts in the subsequent period than the 
non-visiting forecasts. If visiting forecasts contain superior information and the 
information has induced non-visiting analysts to learn from the visiting forecasts, I 
expect to see an increase in the number of analysts who issue their forecasts in the 
period subsequent to the visiting forecasts, when comparing to the non-visiting 
forecasts (that contains no obvious private information). I also examine how the 
change in the number of followers is related to the amount of relevant firm-specific 
information contained in the visiting forecasts. 
 
3.2.2. Hypothesis development 
Theoretically, other analysts may issue forecasts in the period subsequent to the 
issuance of visiting forecasts independently, or as a result of social behaviors 
including herding and/or learning. The same logic applies to the situation of 
non-visiting forecasts. However, visiting forecasts contain more relevant and 
accurate information regarding the earnings of the visiting firms while non-visiting 
forecasts do not have such informational advantages. If the private information 
contained in the visiting forecasts creates an incentive for non-visiting analysts to 
learn from the visiting forecasts, this additional incentive will lead more analysts to 
issue forecasts for the period subsequent to the issuance of visiting forecasts, when 
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comparing with the case of non-visiting forecasts. As a result, I set up the following 
hypothesis to test the above argument: 
H1a: Holding analysts-firm pair constant, visiting forecasts attract more followers 
than non-visiting forecasts do. 
 
In addition, I also examine how the change in the number of followers is related to 
the amount of new relevant information contained in the visiting forecasts. This 
question is important for two reasons. Firstly, this relation is important for 
determining whether the change in the number of followers is related to analysts' 
learning behaviors. Active learning by analysts must involve direct processing of the 
information contained in the visiting forecasts, which predicts a significant relation 
between the number of followers and the information content of the visiting forecasts. 
Independent and/or herding behaviors, however, do not have definite predictions on 
this relation. 
 
Secondly, the relation between the information contained in the visiting forecasts and 
other analysts' decision to follow is theoretically unclear and remains an important 
empirical question for understanding the learning behaviors of analysts. On one hand, 
a visiting forecast containing new information allows non-visiting analysts to obtain 
more information from the forecast. This may help other analysts to understand 
better the visiting firm and prompt more analysts to issue following forecasts. On the 
analysts' incentive to learn from public information including stock prices and 
  
22 
 
analysts' forecasts consensus, Clement et al. (2011) find that analysts have a greater 
learning incentive if stock price and others’ forecasts are informative. However, a 
visiting forecast containing new information may also reduce the possibility for other 
analysts to bring in additional information and/or insight, which might reduce their 
incentive to issue following forecasts. In fact, Clement and Tse (2005) show that 
analysts with more experience and strong ability are more likely to issue forecast 
deviating from consensus (i.e., bold forecast) in order to produce “new” information 
to the market. Therefore, the exact relation remains an empirical question. 
Nevertheless, I propose the following hypothesis for empirical testing: 
H1b:  There is a negative relation between the new information contained in the 
visiting forecasts and the number of followers in the period subsequent to the 
issuance of visiting forecasts. 
 
3.2.3. Sample selection and research design 
I employ a difference-in-difference approach (DID) to discern whether visiting 
forecasts attract more followers than non-visiting forecasts. Specifically, I hold the 
visiting analyst-firm pair constant and compare two groups of analysts: the followers 
of visiting forecasts that contain superior private information and the followers of 
same visiting analyst’s prior non-visiting forecast that contains no obvious private 
information. Since the difference-in-difference approach holds the visiting 
analyst-firm pair constant, this can help to control for other analysts' incentives to 
herd to the forecasts issued by a particular analyst and/or the forecasts relating to a 
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particular firm (Hong et al., 2000; Clement and Tse 2005)5. By adopting this strategy, 
the change in the number of followers between visiting and non-visiting forecast 
should be more likely caused by the learning incentive of other analysts as induced 
by the private information obtained by the visiting analysts. 
 
Figure 1 and Table 2 depicts the procedures and timeline for identifying my testing 
sample. I hand-collect the data on analysts’ site visits for the period of 2007 to 2013 
from the quarterly and annual reports of firms listed in SZSE. Following Cheng et al. 
(2015b), I combine site visit happened on adjacent dates as one event and end up 
with 20,811 firm-level site visit observations. Furthermore, visiting forecasts are 
identified as the forecasts issued by visiting analysts within 30 days after site visit 
event because such focus could ensure that visiting analysts forecast reveals the 
information observed from the visiting event6. This step reduces the sample to 6,993 
visiting forecast observations. I only keep the first visiting forecast if the site visit is 
conducted by multiple analysts and end up with 5,791 visiting forecasts observations. 
To identify the followers, I focus on other analysts' forecasts issued in the period 
subsequent to visiting analysts’ forecast within a 30 days window. That is, the 
number of follower for visiting forecast is defined as the number of analysts who 
issued forecast within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast. I further 
require visiting analyst to issue at least one forecast during the 6 months prior to the 
                                                             
5 Holding analyst-firm pair constant can also mitigate the potential endogeneity problem arising from 
analysts’ tendncy to visit a particular firm or firms’ tendency to choose a particular analyst to visit. 
6 Cheng et al. (2015b) also use 30 days window to identify visiting forecasts. 
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visiting forecast in order to identify the non-visiting forecast. The number of 
followers for the non-visiting forecast is then defined in the same way. After 
dropping observation with missing values in controls, the final sample includes 1,490 
visiting forecasts observations from 2007 to 2013. 
 
To test H1a, I use the univariate test to compare the number of followers for both 
visiting and non-visiting forecast. To test H2b, I use the following regressions to 
investigate how the change in the number of followers is related to the information 
contained in the visiting forecasts, after controlling for a host of analyst and firm 
characteristics: 
 
ln_change = α + β1accuracy_change +  β2firm_exp +  β3star_dummy + β4broker_szie +
β4ana_firm_coverage + β5Revenue_growth + β6loss_dummy + β7tangibility +
β8manu_dummy + β9b2m + β10mkv + ε                                     (1) 
 
d_change = α + β1accuracy_change + β2firm_exp + β3star_dummy + β4broker_szie +
β4ana_firm_coverage + β5Revenue_growth + β6loss_dummy + β7tangibility +
β8manu_dummy + β9b2m + β10mkv + ε                                     (2) 
 
Equations 1 and 2 represent two different ways to measure the change in the number 
of followers. In equation 1, ln_change measures the change in the number of 
followers for visiting analysts (computed as the log transformation of one plus the 
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number of followers for the visiting forecast minus the log transformation of one plus 
the number of followers for the non-visiting forecast). In equation 2, d_change is 
another measure of the change in the number of followers for visiting analysts and is 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the number of followers for the visiting forecast 
is larger than the number of followers for the non-visiting forecast and equals to 0 
otherwise.  
 
Cheng et al. (2015b) support that visiting forecasts do contain valuable information 
by demonstrating that the improvement in forecast accuracy of the visiting forecasts 
is more pronounced relative to the non-visiting forecasts. That is, they use the 
improvement in forecast accuracy of the forecasts of the visiting analysts to capture 
the existence and the amount of new and useful information obtained by the visiting 
analysts during the corporate site visit. Following their study, I also proxy for the 
amount of new information contained in the visiting forecasts by using the 
improvement in forecast accuracy of the visiting forecasts relative to the non-visiting 
forecasts. Specifically, the variable of interest is accuracy_change, which is 
computed as the scaled forecast error of the visiting forecast minus the scaled 
forecast error of the non-visiting forecast. H1b hypothesizes that the coefficient of 
accuracy_change is positive. 
 
Following prior studies, I control for other variables that affect the incentives of 
analysts to issue following forecasts. In particular, I control the variables that may 
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induce analysts to herd to other analysts. Analysts with more experience, high ability, 
and from larger brokerage firm are less likely to herd (Hong et al., 2000; Clement 
and Tse, 2005). Thus, I include a few analyst characteristics that affect analyst’s 
tendency to follow firm_exp measures analyst’s firm specific experience and is 
computed as the number of years between an analyst’s first forecast for firm i and 
his/her current forecast for firm i. star_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one 
if the analyst is ranked as the star analyst by the New Fortune magazine in the 
previous year. broker_size measures the size of the brokerage firm and is computed 
as the number of analysts working for the brokers in a specific year. 
ana_firm_coverage is computed as the number of firms analyst is assigned to follow 
in a specific year. 
 
Cheng et al. (2015b) find that analysts benefit more when visiting manufacturing 
firms and firms with high tangible assets. Therefore, I include both manu_dummy 
and tangibility to control for the effectiveness of site visit. manu_dummy is a dummy 
variable that equals to one if the firm is a manufacturing firm, and 0 otherwise while 
tangibility is computed as the ratio of PP&E over total assets. Lastly, I also include 
some other firm characteristics that can affect the influence of visiting forecast and 
site visit choices, including revenue_growth that measures the revenue growth of the 
firm and is computed as the revenue in year t divided by the revenue in year t-1, 
loss_dummy that is a dummy variable that equals to one if the net income is negative 
in year t, and 0 otherwise, b2m that is the book-to-market ratio and is computed as 
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the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity, and mkv that is the 
firm size and is computed as the log transformation of the market value of equity of 
firm. I also include industry and year fixed effects in the regression model. 
 
3.2.4. Univariate test for testing H1a 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the univariate test of the number of followers for visiting 
and non-visiting forecast. The table shows that the average number of follower for 
visiting forecast is larger than the number of follower for the non-visiting forecast 
(2.44 vs 1.51). The difference is statistically significant at 1 percent level. 
Specifically, on average, the number of follower increases by almost 1 for visiting 
forecasts, which represents an increase of about 60 percent. This result is consistent 
with H1a, which indicates that visiting forecasts induce more followers than 
non-visiting forecasts do. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables included in my 
estimation of equations 1 and 2. The two variables that measure the change in the 
number of followers (i.e., d_change and ln_change) are all positive on average. The 
average number of firm experience of analyst is 1.8 years. This is probably because 
the financial analyst is a new profession in China and many analysts have just 
acquired their professional qualifications and recently entered into the industry. The 
average brokerage firm size is 44 analysts, while the average number of firms an 
analyst is assigned to follow is 23 firms. For firm characteristics, the median of 
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revenue growth rate is about 24%, the average book-to-market ratio is around 0.3 and 
the average market capitalization is roughly 6.7 billion RMB. 
 
3.2.5. Regression analysis for testing H1b 
Table 4 reports the regression results for equation 1 and 2. Specifically, the 
coefficient of accuracy_change is significantly positive. Since accuracy_change is 
computed as the accuracy change between visiting forecast and prior non-visiting 
forecast, a negative value implies an increase in forecast accuracy while a positive 
value implies a decrease in forecast accuracy. Therefore, the results show that an 
increase in the private information obtained by the visiting analysts is associated with 
a decrease in the number of followers of visiting forecast. In other words, visiting 
forecasts containing more new information regarding the visiting firms actually 
discourage other analysts from issuing following forecasts. 
 
Regarding variables of analyst and firm characteristics that have been demonstrated 
by prior studies that affect analysts' herding behavior, I do not find many significant 
results. Only firm_exp and b2m are significant in equation 1 and 2 respectively, 
implying that more experienced visiting analyst and low growth firms are associated 
with an increase in the number of followers. The lack of significant results on 
analysts and firm characteristics but the significant relation of information contained 
in the forecasts further suggests that the change in the number of followers might be 
associated with learning rather than herding motives. 
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3.3. The influence of visiting forecasts on following forecasts 
3.3.1. Introduction 
The previous section shows that visiting forecast does attract more following 
forecasts. This section further examines how the visiting forecasts influence the 
content of the following forecasts. Specifically, I utilize a method as developed by 
Cohn and Juergens (2014) to gauge the extent to which a new forecast issued by an 
analyst causes the other analyst to revise his/her forecast towards the new forecast. If 
the followers of the visiting forecasts do learn from the visiting forecasts, I expect to 
observe following forecasts moving towards visiting forecasts considerably. 
 
3.3.2. Hypothesis Development 
One distinctive characteristic of learning is that it involves analysts actively 
processing and incorporating others' information into their own forecasts (Greve, 
2011). If followers have processed the information contained in a visiting forecast 
and incorporated that information into their own forecasts, the content of the 
following forecasts will be significantly influenced by the visiting forecasts. To 
capture such inter-analyst influence, Cohn and Juergens (2014) suggest a method to 
examine the difference in the content of the forecasts issued by two different analysts 
(referred as the “gap”). Specifically, a “gap” represents the difference of forecasts 
between two analysts and if the “gap” becomes smaller after the issuance of a new 
forecast by one analyst, we can infer that the analyst who issues the new forecast has 
been influenced by the other analyst. Applying this method to my context, the gap is 
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the difference between the visiting analyst’s forecast and the following analyst’s 
most recent prior forecast. I then compute the fraction of this “gap” that is closed by 
the following analyst’s subsequent revision. Revision is defined as the difference 
between following analyst’s forecast and his/her most recent prior forecast. Gap 
closed is then defined as revision divided by “gap”. This is the fraction of the gap 
that has been closed when the following analyst revises his/her forecast. It captures 
the degree to which the following analyst moves towards the visiting analyst after 
processing and incorporating the information contained in the visiting forecasts. 
Appendix B shows a detailed numeric example. Analyst i issued an EPS forecast (i.e., 
visiting forecast) of $1.15 on June 1, 2009 after the site visit. Analyst j revises his 
EPS forecast on June 15 from $0.8 (May 5, 2009) to $1.05. In this case, gap equals to 
+$0.35 ($1.15-$0.8) and revision equals to +$0.25 ($1.05-$0.8). gap_closed equals 
to +0.71 ($0.25/$0.35). We could interpret as analyst j closed 71% of the $0.35 gap 
between the visiting forecast and his most recent forecast. A positive value of 
gap_closed indicates that the following analyst has been influenced by the visiting 
forecast. 
 
If the private information contained in the visiting forecasts has induced the 
followers to incorporate the information into their own forecasts while non-visiting 
forecasts do not have such informational effect, I expect that the following forecasts 
will be influenced more by the visiting forecasts and move towards the visiting 
forecasts to a greater extent than when the following forecasts were influenced by 
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non-visiting forecasts do. Furthermore, if the “gap” closed is due to the processing of 
information contained in the visiting forecasts rather than non-informational 
processing reasons, I expect that the “gap” will be closed to a greater extent when the 
visiting forecasts contain more relevant and accurate information regarding the 
earnings of the visiting firms. The above discussion leads to the following two 
hypotheses: 
H2a: On average, followers of the visiting forecast close the “gap” to a greater extent 
than the followers of the non-visiting forecast. 
H2b: On average, the more relevant and accurate information regarding the earnings 
of the visiting firms visiting forecast contains, the greater the “gap” that will be 
closed. 
 
3.3.3. Sample selection and research design 
Figure 2 depicts the procedure and timeline for identifying the sample for testing the 
above two hypotheses. Visiting forecasts are identified as forecasts issued by visiting 
analysts within the 30 days after visiting event. Following forecasts are identified as 
the forecasts issued by non-visiting analysts within 30 days after the issuance of the 
visiting forecast. To calculate the gap, I further select the followers who have issued 
a forecast during the 6 months prior to the following forecast.  
 
A non-visiting forecast is identified as the visiting analyst’s most recent forecast 
regarding the same firm during the 6 months prior to the visiting forecast. The 
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corresponding following forecasts and followers’ prior forecast are identified by 
using the same procedures as above. The final sample includes 1,526 visiting analyst 
observations from 2007 to 2013. My sample construction holds the visiting analyst 
and firm pair constant. This helps to address the concern that the characteristics of 
analysts and/or firms, rather than the visiting forecasts have actually influenced the 
following forecasts. 
 
gap_closed is winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of 
extreme values. Following Cohn and Juergens (2014), I then use the following 
regressions to estimate the influence of visiting forecasts on the following forecasts: 
 
gap_closed = α + β1interval +  β2interval
2 +  β3interval
3 + ε                    (3) 
 
gap_closed = α + β1accuracy_change + β2horizon_change +  β3firm_exp +
 β4star_dummy + β5broker_szie + β6ana_firm_coverage + β7Revenue_growth +
β8loss_dummy + β9tangibility + β10manu_dummy + β11b2m + β12mkv + ε       (4)                         
 
In equation 3, interval is defined as the difference between the date of the visiting 
analyst’s forecast and the date of the following analyst’s forecast. interval measures 
the amount of common information available between the two forecasts and the 
longer the interval, the more the common information. Controlling the amount of 
common information helps to discern the effect caused by the information contained 
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in the visiting forecast. interval2 is the squared term of interval while interval3 is the 
quadratic term of interval. The second and third powers of the interval are used to 
control a nonlinear relationship that could bias the intercept estimates. The intercept 
from the regression captures how much the following forecasts have revised towards 
the visiting forecasts. I estimate equation 3 for visiting forecasts and non-visiting 
forecasts separately to discern their respective influences on their following forecasts. 
H2a hypothesizes that the intercept for visiting forecasts is greater than the intercept 
for non-visiting forecasts.  
 
In equation 4, I regress gap_closed on different analyst and firm characteristics. The 
variable of interest as hypothesized by H3b is accuracy_change, which measures the 
amount of relevant and accurate information contained in the visiting forecast and is 
defined in the same way as in the previous section. horizon_change is defined as log 
transformation of the difference in forecasting horizon between following analyst’s 
two forecasts. This variable measures the change in common information during that 
period. The longer the horizon between following analyst’s two forecasts, the more 
common information one would expect. This variable helps to mitigate the influence 
of common information on the following analysts' revisions. Other variables are 
defined in the same way as in the previous section. 
 
3.3.4. Univariate test 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the univariate test of the influence of visiting forecast. 
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The table shows that the gap_closed for visiting forecast is 0.56 while the 
gap_closed for the non-visiting forecast is 0.33 and both are statistically significant. 
The results indicate that on average, the forecasts following visiting forecast closes 
56% of the previous gap and is much larger than the gap that has been closed for the 
forecasts following non-visiting forecast (i.e., 33%). This result is consistent with the 
notion that the visiting forecast has exerted greater influence on the content of 
following forecasts than non-visiting forecasts. Nevertheless, the univariate results 
have not controlled for the common information that may influence the amount of 
gap closed. 
 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the variables included in 
equations 4. The mean of accuracy_change is negative, which implies that on 
average, visiting forecast provides positive amount of relevant and accurate 
information regarding the earnings of the firm. Other control variables are all 
comparable to the sample in the previous chapter. The average number of analyst’s 
firm experience is 1.95 years. The average brokerage firm size is 44, while the 
average number of firms an analyst is assigned to follow is 23. For firm 
characteristics, the median of revenue growth rate is about 24%, the average 
book-to-market ratio is around 0.3 and the mean market capitalization is roughly 10 
billion RMB. 
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3.3.5. Regression analysis 
Table 6 reports the regression results for equation 3. Columns 1 and 2 show the 
results for non-visiting forecasts. Columns 3 and 4 show the results for visiting 
forecasts. For both visiting and non-visiting forecasts, I estimate the model by using 
the first power of interval (Columns 1 and 3), and then using the three powers of 
interval further to control the nonlinearities (Columns 2 and 4). As shown in the table, 
the coefficients of all inrevals are not significant, suggesting that the main influence 
comes from the forecast itself but not the common information that changes over 
time. For the results relating to the visiting forecasts, Column 3 and 4 indicate that 
the constants are all significantly positive at 1 percent level. The results suggest that 
66% and 54% of the gap between visiting forecast and the following analyst’s prior 
forecast has been closed by his revision. For the non-visiting forecasts, the constant 
term is marginally significant in column 1 and not significant in column 2. Overall, 
the results suggest that non-visiting forecast does not significantly influence the 
content of the following forecast. The comparison between the influence of visiting 
and non-visiting forecast shows that visiting forecast is much more influential to 
following analyst than non-visiting forecasts. The results are consistent with the 
notion that visiting forecasts contain useful information and have influenced the 
visiting forecasts.  
 
Table 7 reports the regression results for testing H3b. The main variable of interest is 
accuracy_change. Consistent with my expectation, the coefficient of 
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accuracy_change is statistically negative, implying that following forecasts move 
closer to visiting forecast when visiting forecast contains more relevant and accurate 
information regarding the earnings of the firms. The results indicate that the 
followers are more willing to incorporate the information contained in the visiting 
forecasts into their forecasts if the visiting forecasts contain more useful information. 
The significant relation between the information contained in the visiting forecasts 
and the amount of gap that has been closed suggest that followers are likely to have 
involved in the active processing of the information contained in the visiting 
forecasts. 
 
In terms of variables of analyst and firm characteristics, the only significant variable 
is brokersize. The result implies that following forecasts tend to move closer to 
visiting forecast when visiting analyst comes from larger brokerage firms. The 
coefficients of other firm and analysts characteristics that have been shown to 
influence analysts' herding behavior are statistically insignificant. In conjunction 
with the significant relation between the information contained in the visiting 
forecasts and the amount of gap that has been closed, the generally lack of significant 
relation between firm and analysts characteristics and the amount of gap that has 
been closed further suggest that the amount of gap that has been closed is more likely 
to be caused by learning rather than herding behaviors of the following analysts. 
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3.4. Accuracy change of followers and non-followers 
3.4.1. Introduction 
The previous section shows that visiting forecasts have significantly influenced the 
content of following forecasts. This section aims to provide evidence on how 
following analysts benefit from the content of visiting forecast. Specifically, I 
compare the change in forecast accuracy of two groups of analysts: analysts who 
issue forecasts after the issuance of visiting forecasts (followers) and analysts who 
issue forecasts before the visiting forecasts (non-followers). If following analysts do 
learn from the content and information contained in the visiting forecast and 
incorporate that information into their own forecasts, I expect followers of visiting 
forecast to show a greater improvement in forecast accuracy than non-followers do. 
 
3.4.2. Hypothesis development 
Even though previous analyses show that visiting forecast attracts more followers 
and the followers’ forecasts move towards visiting forecast, whether followers do 
benefit from the information contained in the visiting forecasts is still an empirical 
question. If followers effectively process and incorporate the information contained 
in the visiting forecasts, I expect to observe followers of the visiting forecasts to be 
associated with a greater improvement in forecast accuracy than the non-followers. 
Furthermore, if the improvement in accuracy is due to the processing of information 
contained in the visiting forecasts, the improvement in accuracy of the following 
forecast is expected be positively related to the amount of relevant and accurate 
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information contained in the visiting forecasts. I therefore formulate the following 
two hypotheses for empirical testing: 
H3a: On average, the improvement in forecast accuracy is more pronounced for the 
following forecasts of visiting forecast than the non-following forecasts of visiting 
forecasts. 
H3b: On average, the improvement in forecast accuracy of the following forecast of 
visiting forecasts is more pronounced when the visiting forecast contains more 
relevant and accurate information regarding the earnings of the firm. 
 
3.4.3. Sample selection and research design 
Figure 3 depicts the procedures and timeline for identifying the sample for testing 
H3a and H3b. Similar to the procedures adopted in the previous sections, I identify 
visiting forecasts as the forecasts issued by visiting analysts within 30 days after 
visiting event. Followers are identified as the forecasts issued within 30 days after 
the issuance of the visiting forecast. Non-followers are identified as the forecasts 
issued during 30 days before the issuance of the visiting forecasts. I further require 
followers and non-followers to issue at least one forecast regarding the same firm 
during 6 months prior to the current forecast. The final sample includes 3,483 analyst 
observations from 2007 to 2013. 
 
To test H3a, I use univariate analysis to compare the change in accuracy for both 
followers and non-followers. To test H3b, I use the following regressions to 
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investigate how the accuracy change of the followers is related to the information 
contained in the visiting forecasts: 
 
∆accuracy = α + β1follower_visit + β2accuracy_change + β3horizon_change +
 β4firm_exp +  β5star_dummy + β6broker_szie + β7ana_firm_coverage +
β8revenue_growth + β9loss_dummy + β10tangibility + β11manu_dummy + β12b2m +
β13mkv + ε                                                             (5) 
 
∆accuracy = α + β1follower_visit + β2accuracy_change_d + β3firm_exp_d +
 β4star_dummy_d + β5broker_szie_d + β6ana_firm_coverage_d +
β7revenue_growth_d + β8loss_dummy_d + β9tangibility_d + β10manu_dummy_d +
β11b2m_d + β12mkv_d + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ε                                      (6)                   
 
where ∆accuracy measures the change in forecast error and is computed as the 
difference between forecast error of analyst i and his forecast during 6 months prior 
to the current forecast scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year for a 
given firm and fiscal year. follower_visit is a dummy variable that equals to one if 
the forecast is identified as a following forecast of visiting forecast, and 0 otherwise. 
The coefficient of this variable should be negative if H4a is confirmed. 
 
To test H3b, the variable of interest is accuracy_change, which measures the 
informativeness of the visiting forecast and is defined in the same way as in the 
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previous chapter. Other variables are also defined in the same way as in the previous 
chapter. horizon_change is computed as log transformation of the difference in 
forecasting horizon between analyst’s prior and current forecast. The change in 
forecasting horizon is needed because prior study has shown that forecasts issued 
closer to earnings announcements are more accurate than those issued earlier 
(Clement 1999). In equation 6, I also include the interaction terms of different 
characteristics and the dummy of following forecast of visiting forecast. This model 
helps to examine whether learning effectiveness of followers is related to the 
information contained in the visiting forecasts. The coefficient of this interaction 
term should be positive if H3b is supported. Other control variables are defined in the 
same way as in the previous sections. 
 
3.4.4. Univariate test for testing H3a 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the univariate test of change in forecast accuracy for both 
followers and non-followers. The table shows that both analyst groups experience an 
improvement in accuracy. However, the improvement of following forecast of 
visiting forecast is more pronounced (0.0031 vs. 0.0014), and the difference is 
statistically significant at 1 percent l level. The result lends support to my H3a. 
Moreover, following forecast of visiting forecast has higher forecast error in the prior 
period but becomes more accurate after the issuance of the visiting forecasts. Both 
differences are statistically significant at 1 percent level. These results are consistent 
with my prediction that following forecasts of visiting forecast do benefit from the 
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visiting forecast. 
 
Panel B of Table 8 presents the summary statistics of the key variables included in 
the regression models to test H3a and H3b. The mean of ∆accuracy is negative, 
implying that on average, both groups of analysts experience an improvement in 
forecast accuracy. The mean of accuracy_change is negative, implying that on 
average, visiting forecast provides more accurate information regarding the firms' 
actual earnings. Other control variables are all comparable to the samples in the 
previous chapters. The average number of firm experience is 1.88 years. The average 
brokerage firm size is 42, the average number of firms an analyst is assigned to 
follow is 22. For firm characteristics, the median of revenue growth rate is about 
24%, the average book-to-market ratio is around 0.26 and the mean market 
capitalization is roughly 9.3 billion RMB. 
 
3.4.5. Regression analysis for testing H3b 
Column 1 of Table 9 reports the regression results for testing H3a. Consistent with 
the results from the univariate test, the coefficient of the dummy variable for 
following forecast of visiting forecast (follower_visit) is statistically negative at 1 
percent level, suggesting that the improvement in forecast accuracy is more 
pronounced for followers of visiting forecast compared to non-followers of visiting 
forecast. Column 2 shows the results when I add one additional interaction term (i.e., 
accuracy_change_d) to equation 5. The coefficient between ∆accuracy and 
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accuracy_change_d is statistically positive, implying that the accuracy of the 
following forecasts improves more when visiting forecasts contain more relevant and 
accurate information regarding the earnings of the visiting firms. In column 3, I 
include all the interaction terms. The results are still consistent with H3b. 
Specifically, the coefficient between ∆accuracy and accuracy_change_d is 
statistically positive at 1 percent level. This confirms my prediction that followers of 
visiting forecast improve more when the visiting forecast is more informative. In 
terms of other interaction terms, firm_exp_d is significantly positive, suggesting that 
more experienced followers benefit less from the visiting forecast. One plausible 
explanation is that more experience analyst trusts more on their information and is 
less willing to learn from other’s information. The improvement is also more 
pronounced for mature firms, as indicated by the negative coefficient of b2m_d. The 
result suggests that the learning effectiveness of the following analysts is higher for 
more mature firms. This may be caused by the fact that mature firms are easier to 
understand. As a result, following analysts tend to have a greater ability to extract 
useful information from the visiting forecasts of the mature firms and incorporate 
that information more effectively into their forecasts. 
 
3.4.6. Regressions with self-selection problems mitigated 
Analysts are self-selected to become followers. To address the concern that my 
results are caused by unobservable characteristics of the followers other than the 
information contained in the visiting forecast, this sub-section uses Heckman's 
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two-stage method to address the concern of self-selection bias. 
 
3.4.6.1. Sample selection and research design 
I use the same sample as in the previous tests for the test in this sub-section. The only 
difference is that I use the sample of both followers and non-followers to estimate the 
probability of being a follower. The final sample includes 3,018 analyst observations 
from 2007 to 2013. 
 
I use the Heckman two-stage sample correction method to address the sample 
selection bias. In the first stage, I use the following probit regression to estimate the 
probability of issuing a following forecast: 
 
treated = α + β1accuracy_change +  β2horizon_change +  β3firm_exp +
 β4star_dummy + β5broker_szie + β6ana_firm_coverage + β7Revenue_growth +
β8loss_dummy + β9tangibility + β10manu_dummy + β11b2m + β12mkv +
β13freq_follower + ε                                                      (7) 
 
where treated is a dummy variable that equals to one if the forecast is identified as a 
following forecast of visiting forecast, and 0 otherwise. freq_follower measures 
analyst’s tendency of being a follower and is a dummy variable that equals to one if 
the number of following forecast an analyst issued in that year is larger than or 
equals to the mean number of following forecast issued by all analysts. freq_follower 
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is associated with the probability of issuing a following forecast but has no obvious 
relation to the change in forecast error. This variable is used for identification 
purpose. Other control variables are defined in the same way as in the previous 
section. 
 
In the second stage, I use the following regression to re-estimate ∆accuracy on 
different characteristics by including the inverse mills ratio obtained from the first 
stage regression: 
 
∆accuracy = α + β1follower_visit + β2accuracy_change + β3horizon_change +
 β4firm_exp +  β5star_dummy + β6broker_szie + β7ana_firm_coverage +
β8revenue_growth + β9loss_dummy + β10tangibility + β11manu_dummy + β12b2m +
β13mkv + β14lambda + ε                                             (8) 
 
where lambda is the inverse mills ratio obtained from the first stage regression. 
 
3.4.6.2. Regression analysis 
Table 10 reports the regression results for equation 7. The results show that only a 
few characteristics have predictive power on the decision of issuing a following 
forecast. The coefficient on horizon_change is negative, suggesting that analyst is 
more likely to issue a forecast if he has not updated his forecast for a while. With 
regards to firm characteristics, analysts are more likely to learn from other’s 
  
45 
 
information if the firm has low growth rate, has more tangible assets, operates in the 
manufacturing industry, and has larger size. The coefficient on freq_follower is 
significantly positive, suggesting that the decision to follow visiting forecast is 
related to analysts' timing strategy in issuing a forecast. 
 
Column 2 of Table 11 reports the regression results for equation 8. Compared to the 
baseline model in column 1 of Table 11, where I did not correct for the self-selection 
bias, the main results still hold. Specifically, the coefficient of accuracy_change is 
positive, suggesting that following forecasts improve more when visiting forecast 
contain more relevant and accurate information regarding the firm. Similar to the 
results in column 1 of Table 11, the learning effect is less pronounced for more 
experience analyst. The negative coefficient of star_dummy suggests that star 
analysts benefit more from visiting forecast. One plausible explanation is that star 
analysts usually have better ability, which helps them to extract and learn from others’ 
information. The improvement is also more pronounced for mature firms as indicated 
by the negative coefficient of b2m. 
 
In sum, the results in this section suggest that following analysts do benefit from the 
visiting forecast and the learning effect is more pronounced when visiting forecast 
contains a greater amount of useful information regarding the firms' earnings. The 
results from Heckman two-stage model suggest that the overall results are unlikely to 
be driven by self-selection biases. 
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3.5. Information environment 
3.5.1. Introduction 
In this section, I examine how analyst’s learning activity from visiting forecast 
affects the information environment of the visiting firms. I use three measures to 
capture the firm-level information environment, namely, analyst forecast dispersion, 
common information, and the accuracy of consensus forecast to examine the impact 
of learning on the information environment of the visiting firms. If the following 
analysts do learn from the visiting forecasts, I expect a decrease in analyst forecast 
dispersion, an increase in common information, and an improvement in forecast 
accuracy since the following analysts have been simultaneously influenced by the 
same visiting forecast that contains useful information. 
 
3.5.2. Hypothesis development 
Analyst forecast dispersion has been widely used to measure firm information 
environment (Heflin et al., 2003; Byard et al., 2010). Higher forecast dispersion 
indicates the existence of a larger disagreement among analyst. If the following 
analysts do learn from the visiting forecasts, I expect a decrease in analyst forecast 
dispersion since the following analysts simultaneously incorporate the information 
contained in the same visiting forecast into their own forecasts. However, if the 
followers of non-visiting forecasts had not been influenced systematically by the 
non-visiting forecasts, we will not observe the corresponding change in the 
non-visiting forecasts. 
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Barron et al. (1998) suggest that forecast dispersion of analysts contains both 
common and private information. Their model measures the relation between the 
properties of analyst’ information environment (uncertainty and information 
asymmetry) and forecast properties (dispersion and squared error in the mean 
forecast). Specifically, common measures the common information possessed by 
analysts and private measures the private information possessed by the analyst. 
common and private are estimated using observable properties of analysts’ forecasts: 
common  =  
(𝑆𝐸−
𝐷
𝑁
)
[(1−
1
𝑁
)𝐷+𝑆𝐸]
2  ,     private  =  
𝐷
[(1−
1
𝑁
)𝐷+𝑆𝐸]
2 
 
where N is the number of analysts’ forecasts. D is the variance of the analysts’ 
forecasts. SE is the squared error in the mean forecast, computed as the squared 
difference between the mean forecasted EPS and actual EPS i.e. (Mean forecasted 
EPS – Actual EPS)2. 
 
If following analysts do learn from the same visiting forecasts, I expect to see an 
increase in common information in the period subsequent to the visiting forecasts. 
However, if the followers of non-visiting forecasts have not been influenced 
systematically by the non-visiting forecasts, we cannot observe the corresponding 
change in common information in the period subsequent to the issuance of the 
non-visiting forecasts.  
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Previous studies suggest that more accurate forecasts indicate a firm with a better 
information environment. Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggest that firms with better 
disclosure quality tend to have lower analyst forecast errors. Hope (2003) shows that 
countries with better disclosure policies and enforcement are associated with higher 
analyst forecast accuracy. Horton et al. (2013) find that the consensus forecast errors 
decrease for firms that mandatorily adopt IFRS relative to forecast errors of other 
firms. Similar to the prior literature, I also view an improvement in forecast accuracy 
as an indicator of better information environment.  
 
If following analysts do benefit from the visiting forecasts, which contain useful 
information, I expect to see an improvement in forecast accuracy in the period 
subsequent to the visiting forecasts. However, if the followers of non-visiting 
forecasts have not benefited from the non-visiting forecasts, we cannot observe the 
corresponding change in forecast accuracy in the period subsequent to the issuance 
of the non-visiting forecasts.  
 
Taking the above discussion into consideration, I formulate the following hypotheses 
for empirical testing: 
H5a: On average, forecast dispersion decreases in the period subsequent to the 
issuance of visiting forecast while there is no such change for non-visiting forecasts. 
H5b: On average, common information increases in the period subsequent to the 
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issuance of visiting forecast while there is no such change for non-visiting forecasts. 
H5c: On average, the accuracy of consensus forecast increases in the period 
subsequent to the issuance of visiting forecast while there is no such change for 
non-visiting forecasts. 
 
3.5.3. Sample selection and research design 
Figure 4 depicts the procedure and timeline for identifying the sample for testing H5a, 
H5b, and H5c. Similar to the previous sample selection procedures, I first require 
visiting analysts to issue a forecast within 30 days after visiting event. To compare 
the changes in dispersion and common information for both visiting and non-visiting 
forecasts, I form four groups of forecasts, Group 1 refers to forecasts issued within 
30 days after analyst i’s visiting forecast, group 2 refers to forecasts issued during 30 
days prior to analyst i’s visiting forecast, group 3 refers to forecasts issued within 30 
days after analyst i’s prior non-visiting forecast issued during the 6 months prior to 
the visiting forecast, and group 4 refers to forecasts issued during 30 days prior to 
analyst i’s prior non-visiting forecast issued during the 6 months prior to the visiting 
forecast. My final sample include 1,326 firm observations and 361 firm observations 
for visiting and non-visiting forecasts respectively for conducting the tests on the 
change in dispersion, 1,313 firm observations and 360 firm observations for visiting 
and non-visiting forecasts respectively for conducting the test on the change in 
common information, and 2,935 firm observations and 490 firm observations for 
visiting and non-visiting forecasts respectively for conducting the test on the change 
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in forecast accuracy. 
 
To examine the change in forecast dispersion, I compute the change in analyst 
forecast dispersion in the periods after and before analyst i’s visiting forecast and 
compared that to the change during the similar periods but with regards to analyst i’s 
prior non-visiting forecast. Dispersion is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation 
of analysts’ current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts to the absolute 
value of the mean forecasts. 
 
In the second test, I use a model developed by Barron et al. (1998) to measure the 
change in both common and private information. To test the change in common and 
private information shared by analysts, I compute the change in common and private 
information in the periods after and before analyst i’s visiting forecast and compared 
that to the change during similar periods but with regards to analyst i’s prior 
non-visiting forecast. 
 
In the last test, I compute the accuracy of consensus in the periods after and before 
analyst i’s visiting forecast and compared that to the change during the similar 
periods but with regards to analyst i’s prior non-visiting forecast. The accuracy of 
consensus is computed as the absolute forecast error of consensus forecast, scaled by 
the stock price at the beginning of the year. 
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3.5.4. Empirical results 
Table 12 reports the univariate test of the change in forecast dispersion before and 
after visiting analysts’ forecasts. The result from Panel A shows that on average, 
forecast dispersion decreases in the period subsequent to visiting forecasts and the 
results are statistically significant at 1 percent level. On the other hand, the result 
from Panel B shows that on average, there is no significant change in forecast 
dispersion for visiting analysts’ prior non-visiting forecast. These results confirm the 
notion that forecast dispersion decreases after visiting forecast as a result of learning 
behavior among analysts. 
 
Table 13 presents the univariate test of the change in common and private 
information before and after visiting analysts’ forecasts. The result from Panel A 
shows that on average, common information increases after visiting forecast and the 
result is statistically significant at 1 percent level. On the other hand, there is no 
significant change in private information after visiting forecast. The result from 
Panel B shows that on average, there is no significant change in both common and 
private information regarding visiting analysts’ prior non-visiting forecasts.  
 
Table 14 shows the univariate test of the change in the accuracy of consensus 
forecast before and after visiting analysts’ forecasts. The result from Panel A shows 
that on average, the forecast error of consensus forecast decreases after visiting 
forecast and the result is statistically significant at 5 percent level. The result from 
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Panel B shows that on average, there is no significant change in forecast error of 
consensus forecast regarding visiting analysts’ prior non-visiting forecasts. 
 
These results support the notion that following analysts do learn from the same 
visiting forecasts and learning among analysts improves the information environment 
of corresponding firms. 
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Chapter 4. Robustness Tests 
 
4.1. Accuracy relative to consensus forecast 
In the main tests, I use the changes in forecast accuracy of the visiting forecasts to 
proxy the amount of relevant and accurate information obtained by the visiting 
analysts during the corporate visits. Some might argue that other analysts' incentive 
to follow/learn from the visiting forecasts might depend not only on the information 
obtained by the visiting analysts but also on the availability of the most updated 
firm-specific information regarding the visiting firms just before the visiting 
forecasts are issued. That is, analysts may continuously learn from all analysts. To 
the extent that some information obtained by the visiting analysts have somehow 
been diffused to other analysts and those analysts have made use of the information 
to issue forecast before the visiting analysts, the new information contained in the 
visiting analysts in the eyes of other analysts may not be accurately proxied by the 
change in accuracy of the visiting forecast relative to non-visiting forecasts. Under 
that circumstance, the amount of new information may be more properly proxied by 
the change in accuracy of the visiting forecasts concerning the consensus forecasts 
immediately before the issuance of the visiting forecasts. 
 
I conduct a robustness test to examine whether my results are robust to different 
measures of the information contained in the visiting forecasts. To do this, I first 
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examine whether the forecast accuracy of the visiting forecasts is higher than that of 
the prior consensus forecasts. 
 
Similarly to my previous sample selection procedures, I combine site visit happened 
on adjacent dates as one event and end up with 20,811 firm-level site visit 
observations. Furthermore, visiting forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued by 
visiting analysts within 30 days after site visit event because such focus could ensure 
that visiting analyst’s forecast reveals the information observed from the visiting 
event. This step reduces the sample to 6,993 visiting forecast observations. I only 
keep the first visiting forecast if the site visit is conducted by multiple analysts and 
end up with 5,791 visiting forecasts observations. I further require there is at least 
one forecast in the month prior to the visiting forecast in order to compute the 
consensus forecast. My final sample consists a total of 3,832 visiting forecast 
observations. 
 
I use the univariate test to examine the difference in forecast accuracy between 
visiting forecasts and prior consensus forecasts. Specifically, I compare the absolute 
forecast error of these two groups of forecasts. The prior consensus forecast is 
defined as the mean EPS forecast in the month prior to the visiting forecast. 
consensus_fe is computed as the absolute difference between the consensus EPS 
forecast and actual EPS, scaled by the stock price at  the beginning of the year. 
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visiting_fe is computed as the absolute difference between the visiting EPS forecast 
and actual EPS, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year. 
 
Table 15 reports the univariate test of the difference in forecast error between the 
visiting forecast and the prior consensus forecast. As shown in the table, the mean 
absolute forecast error of the visiting forecast is 0.0093 while the mean absolute 
forecast error of the prior consensus forecast is 0.0101. The results confirm that on 
average, the visiting forecast has higher accuracy than the prior consensus forecast 
and the difference is statistically significant at 1 percent level.  
 
I use the new variable of accuracy_change (relative to consensus), defined as the 
difference inaccuracy between the visiting forecasts and the consensus forecasts, to 
replace my previous variable of accuracy_change, and re-estimate Equations 1 to 6. I 
find qualitative consistent results for all the regressions, though the coefficients for 
Equations 1 and 2 are statistically insignificant. The lack of significance may due to 
the offsetting effects regarding the number of followers. It may also indicate the 
sensitivity of our previous results to different information measures. Caution should 
be therefore exercised when we conclude the relation between the change in the 
number of followers and the information contained in the visiting forecasts. To save 
space, I do not report the results of the regressions using the new variable.  
 
 
  
56 
 
4.2. Earnings announcement period 
Prior studies have examined analysts’ behavior after earnings announcement 
(Clement et al., 2010; Schrand et al., 2014). The key premise of their studies is that 
earnings announcement serves as an information shock for analysts. In other words, 
the availability of new information of the firm helps mitigate the information gap 
among different analysts. Therefore, one could argue that if the visiting forecast is 
issued after earnings announcement, the results in the main tests could be caused by 
the common information shock (i.e., earnings announcement) rather than the learning 
activity. 
 
To address this concern, I conduct a robustness test to examine whether the main 
results are robust without the confounding effect of earnings announcement. 
Specifically, I exclude the sample that might be affected by the earnings 
announcement. To be consistent with the main tests, visiting forecasts are identified 
as the forecasts issued by visiting analysts within 30 days after site visit event 
because such focus could ensure that visiting analyst’s forecast reveals the 
information observed from the visiting event. The visiting forecast will be excluded 
if it is issued within 30 days after either a quarterly or annual earnings announcement 
date. I then use the new sample to re-estimate all the tests in the main sections. 
 
Generally, the results are qualitative consistent to the main results. For the test of the 
change in number of followers, the number of followers of visiting forecast is higher 
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than the number of followers of non-visiting forecast (untabulated) and the result is 
statistically significant at 1 percent level. In terms of the regression results, although 
the sign of the coefficients of accuracy_change remains positive, it is only 
marginally significant in equation 2 but not in equation 1. 
 
For the test of the influence of visiting forecasts on following forecast, the results are 
similar to the findings in the main tests. The mean of gap_closed is 0.5031 
(untabulated), which is comparable to the results from the main tests (0.5588), and is 
statistically significant at 1 percent level. The regression analysis also yields a 
statistically negative coefficient of accuracy_change (untabulated), implying that 
following forecasts move closer towards visiting forecast when the visiting forecast 
contains more accurate and relevant information.  
 
For the test of the accuracy change of followers and non-followers, the results are 
also consistent. The univariate test shows that followers of visiting forecasts tend to 
improve more in forecast accuracy compared to non-followers of visiting forecasts. 
The difference in the improvement of forecast accuracy is statistically significant at 1 
percent level (untabulated). The regression results also show that the coefficient of 
accuracy_change is still significantly negative for both equation 5 and 6 
(untabulated), indicating that the improvement in forecast accuracy is more 
pronounced for followers.  
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For the test of information environment change regarding visiting forecast, main 
results still hold. Common information increases in the period subsequent to the 
issuance of visiting forecasts and the result is statistically significant at 10 percent 
level (untabulated). On the other hand, there is no statistically significant change in 
common information regarding the non-visiting forecasts. The consensus forecast 
also improves in forecast accuracy in the period subsequent to the issuance of 
visiting forecasts and the result is statistically significant at 5 percent level 
(untabulated). There is no significant change in forecast accuracy regarding the 
non-visiting forecasts. The dispersion of analyst forecast becomes insignificant for 
both visiting and non-visiting forecasts. Since the sample size is relative small (618 
observations for visiting forecast and 168 observations for non-visiting forecast), the 
results are quite sensitive and should be interpreted with cautious. 
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4.3. Alternative windows in identifying following forecasts 
In the main tests, I use 30 days as the cut-off point to identify the following forecasts 
of the visiting forecasts. In this section, I use two different alternative windows, 20 
and 40 days, and re-estimate the main regressions. 
 
I employ the same sample selection procedures except that following forecasts are 
now identified as the forecasts issued by non-visiting analysts within 20 and 40 days 
after the issuance of visiting forecasts. Other variables are defined in the same way as 
in the main tests. 
 
Generally, the results are similar. For the test of the change in number of followers, 
the number of followers of visiting forecast is higher than the number of followers of 
non-visiting forecast (untabulated) under both 20 and 40 days windows. The results 
are all statistically significant at 1 percent level. In terms of the regression results, the 
coefficients of variable accuracy_change remain positive and are significant at 5 
percent level. 
 
For the test of the influence of visiting forecasts on following forecast, the results are 
also similar. The mean of gap_closed is 0.54 (untabulated) and 0.51 (untabulated) 
under 20 days and 40 days windows and are both larger compared to the non-visiting 
forecasts. The regression analysis also yields statistically negative coefficients of 
variable accuracy_change (untabulated) under both windows. 
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For the test of the accuracy change of followers and non-followers, the results are 
also consistent. The univariate test shows that followers of visiting forecasts tend to 
improve more in forecast accuracy compared to non-followers of visiting forecasts 
under both 20 and 40 days windows. The differences in the improvement of forecast 
accuracy are all statistically significant at 1 percent level (untabulated). The 
regression results also show that the coefficients of variable accuracy_change remain 
significantly negative for both equation 5 and 6 (untabulated). 
 
For the test of information environment change regarding visiting forecast, main 
results still hold. I still find a decrease in forecast dispersion, an increase in common 
information, and an improvement in the accuracy of consensus forecast in the period 
subsequent to the issuance of visiting forecasts under both windows. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion, Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
 
To summarize, I find that the visiting forecasts tend to attract more following 
forecasts than non-visiting forecasts do by comparing the number of followers 
between visiting and non-visiting forecast. The following effect is also weaker when 
the visiting forecasts are more informative. Also, by examining the inter-influence 
among analysts, I find that the following forecasts tend to move closer to the visiting 
forecasts than the prior following forecasts do, with the influences of the visiting 
forecasts being stronger for more informative visiting forecasts. Furthermore, by 
comparing the forecast accuracy change of followers and non-followers of visiting 
forecast, I demonstrate that followers of the visiting forecasts experience a greater 
improvement in their forecast accuracy than non-followers. This effect is also 
stronger when the visiting forecasts are more informative. Last but not the least, I 
find a decline in the analyst forecast dispersion and an increase in common 
information in the period subsequent to the visiting analysts’ forecasts but no such 
effect for the non-visiting forecasts. Collectively, the results suggest that analysts 
have the incentive to learn from the forecasts that contain superior private 
information and such learning activities tend to improve the information environment 
of the visiting firms. 
 
My study also suffers from several limitations. Firstly, it is extremely difficult to 
study the exact cognitive process of analysts. My study only focuses on the earnings 
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forecast of an analyst -- the outcome of learning activities. However, it is very 
difficult to show how and why an analyst really make a forecasting decision and 
come up with such a forecast. Further studies revealing the decision process of 
analyst could further extend our understanding of how analysts actually learn from 
different information sources. Secondly, the sample size in my study is limited 
because of the data availability. I plan to collect the data of site visit and extend the 
sample period in my future work. Although the short window employed in my study 
can mitigate concerns arising from structural changes in the Chinese stock market, I 
also plan to use propensity score matching to find a control sample without site visit 
and visiting forecast when more observations are available. This can allow me to 
conduct a more rigorous difference-in-difference analysis, which can further filter 
out the time-varying changes that occur to both treated and control groups.  
 
In addition to the above future research areas, I may also try to investigate how the 
content of site visit and the visiting forecast may influence the learning process. 
Studying how analysts learn from the content of site visit will enhance our 
understanding on the learning process of analysts. My current study focuses on firms 
listed on SZSE. The firms are usually smaller in size and operate in high technology 
industries than those listed on SHSE. If data from firms listed on SHSE becomes 
available in the future, re-examining my research questions using the data from 
SHSE could further enhance our understanding of how learning behaviors of 
financial analysts are affected by firm characteristics. Lastly, I could also identify 
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other factors (such as corporate transparency, geographic distance, and market 
sentiment) that may influence learning process. 
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Appendix A 
Site visit example: Extract from the 2008 annual report of Nanning Sugar Industry Co., Ltd 
During the reporting period, the company conducted investor activities for a total of 13 times and communicated with 23 different investor bodies. 
Secretary of the board, chief treasurer, senior management staff and corresponding departments participated in the events. Since investors 
participated in such events are more likely to discover non-public information and then disseminate and profit from such information than 
individual investor, the company strictly follows the information disclosure guidelines issued by the SZSE and avoids any discrimination 
between investors. The company ensures that no selective disclosure has happened during any investor activity event and guarantees the fairness 
of information disclosure. The details of investor activities are as follow. 
 
Date Place Format* Investor** Topics discussed and materials provided 
15-Feb-08 Headquarter Site visit Hua An Fund Management 
How sugarcanes' production was affected by the extreme cold weather; 
its influence on sugar production in the coming season 
 
Headquarter Site visit Rongtong Fund Management 
How sugarcanes' production was affected by the extreme cold weather; 
its influence on sugar production in the coming season 
19-Feb-08 Headquarter Site visit Everbright Securities 
How sugarcanes' production was affected by the extreme cold weather; 
its influence on sugar production in the coming season 
 
Headquarter Site visit Fortune Sg Fund Management 
How sugarcanes' production was affected by the extreme cold weather; 
its influence on sugar production in the coming season 
 
Headquarter Site visit China Asset Management 
How sugarcanes' production was affected by the extreme cold weather; 
its influence on sugar production in the coming season 
24-Mar-08 Headquarter Site visit Haitong Securities Operation performance since 2008; sugarcane production 
7-May-08 
 
Telephone 
interviews 
China Universal Asset 
Management 
Business operation; future plans 
  
Telephone 
interviews 
China Post & Capital Fund 
Management 
Business operation; future plans 
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8-May-08 Headquarter Site visit China Great Wall Securities Business operation; future plans 
28-May-08 Headquarter Site visit 
Shenzhen Runge Pioneer 
Invest Management 
Business operation; future plans 
21-Aug-08 Headquarter Site visit Sinolink Secutities Business operation; future plans 
   
GF Securities Business operation; future plans 
1-Sep-08 Headquarter Site visit Haitong Securities Business operation; future plans 
30-Oct-08 Headquarter Site visit Goldman Sachs (Asia) Business operation; future plans 
 
Headquarter Site visit The Cathay Investment Fund Business operation; future plans 
 
Headquarter Site visit 
Schroders Investment 
Management (HK) 
Business operation; future plans 
 
Headquarter Site visit Libra Capital Management Business operation; future plans 
 
Headquarter Site visit Amundi Asset Management Business operation; future plans 
 
Headquarter Site visit 
Highbridge Capital 
Management 
Business operation; future plans 
11-Nov-08 Headquarter Site visit 
ICBC Credit Suisse Asset 
Management 
Business operation; future plans 
17-Dec-08 Headquarter Site visit Essence Securities Business operation; future plans 
 
 
*Site visits accounts for the majority of communication event between company and investors. Other communication events include telephone 
interviews, performance illustration webinars, email exchanges, investor conferences, industry forums, and annual broker conferences 
**There are also some other investor bodies like banks, insurance company, media, and individual investor 
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Appendix B 
Numeric example for sample and variable construction in Chapter 2 
 
This appendix presents a hypothetic numeric example to illustrate how the sample is 
constructed when examining analyst influence. 
 
  
Analyst Date EPS 
Forecast by analyst j’s 5/5/2009 $0.8 
Visiting forecast by analyst i 1/6/2009 $1.15 
Forecast by analyst j 15/6/2009 $1.05 
 
Considered a hypothetic case that analyst i issued an EPS forecast of $1.15 on June 1, 
2009 after site visit. Analyst j revises his EPS forecast on June 15 from $0.8 (May 5, 
2009) to 1.05. 
 
Gap = $1.15 – $0.8 = +$0.35 (the difference between the first two forecast) 
Revision = $1.05 – $0.8 = +$0.25 (the difference between the first and third forecast) 
Gap closed = Revision / Gap = $0.25 / $0.35 = +$0.71 
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Figure 1. Timeline for identifying following forecasts and the number of followers 
 
The number of follower for visiting forecast is computed as the number of analysts who issued forecast within 30 days after the issuance of the 
visiting forecast. Non-visiting forecast is identified as the visiting analyst’s most recent forecast regarding the same firm during the 6 months 
prior to the visiting forecast. The number of follower for non-visiting forecast is then computed in the same way. 
 
 
 
 
 
Analyst i’s visiting forecast 
T T + 30 T - 180 t t + 30 
Analyst i’s non-visiting forecast 
Number of followers for non-visiting forecast 
 
Number of followers for visiting forecast 
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Figure 2. Timeline for identifying following forecasts of visiting and non-visiting forecasts 
 
Following forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast. I further require the follower to 
issue a forecast during the 6 months prior to the following forecast in order to compute revision. Non-visiting forecast is identified as the visiting 
analyst’s most recent forecast regarding the same firm during the 6 months prior to the visiting forecast. Revisions and prior forecasts are 
identified in the same way. 
 
 
 
Analyst i’s visiting forecast 
T T + 30 T - 180 
Analyst j’s prior forecast Analyst j’s following forecast 
of visiting forecast  
Analyst i’s non-visiting forecast 
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Figure 3. Timeline for identifying the accuracy change of following forecasts of visiting and non-visiting forecasts 
 
Following forecasts of the visiting forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast. 
Following forecasts of the non-visiting forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued during 30 days before the issuance of the visiting forecasts. 
I further require followers of the visiting forecasts and followers of the non-visiting forecasts to issue at least one forecast regarding the same 
firm during 6 months prior to the current following forecast.  
 
 
Analyst i’s visiting forecast 
T T + 30 T - 180 
Analyst Y’s following forecast of visiting forecast 
(follower) 
 
T - 30 
Analyst X’s prior forecast 
 
Analyst Y’s prior forecast 
 
Analyst X’s non-following forecast  
of visiting forecast (non-follower) 
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Figure 4. Timeline for identifying the sample in firm level information environment analysis 
 
The sample includes four groups of forecasts: 
(1) forecasts issued within 30 days after analyst i’s visiting forecast 
(2) forecasts issued during 30 days prior to analyst i’s visiting forecast 
(3) forecasts issued within 30 days after analyst i’s non-visiting forecast 
(4) forecasts issued during 30 days prior to analyst i’s non-visiting forecast 
 
Non-visiting forecast is identified as visiting analyst’s most recent forecast during 6 months prior to the visiting forecast. 
 
 
 
Analyst i’s visiting forecast 
 
T T + 30 T - 30 
(1) (2) 
T - 180 
Analyst i’s non-visiting forecast 
 
t t+30 t-30 
(4) (3) 
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Table 1: Sample selection – Site visit 
 
This table shows the sample section procedure for my sample of site visit events 
conducted by brokerage firms during 2007 to 2013 
 
 
 No. Observations 
1. All investor activities records 85,476 
2. Requiring site visits events conducted by sell-side 
analysts 
43,849 
3. Combining same day site visit events as one event 25,256 
4. Dropping observations with missing values for 
variables 
20,811 
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Table 2: Sample selection – Followers of visiting and non-visiting forecast 
 
This table shows the sample section procedure for my sample of site visit events 
conducted by brokerage firms during 2007 to 2013 
 
 
 No. Observations 
1. Site visit observations 20,811 
2. Requiring following analysts to issue a forecast 
within 30 days after site visit 
6,993 
3. Keep the first visiting forecast if the site visit is 
conducted by multiple analysts 
5,791 
4. Requiring visiting analysts to issue at least one 
forecast during the 6 months prior to the visiting 
forecasts 
1,490 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on followers of visiting and non-visiting forecasts 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for 1,490 visiting analyst observations from 
2007 to 2013. I restrict the sample to visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30 
days after the visiting event. The number of follower for visiting forecast is then 
computed as the number of analysts who issued forecast within 30 days after the 
issuance of the visiting forecast. Non-visiting forecast is identified as the visiting 
analyst’s most recent forecast regarding the same firm during the 6 months prior to 
the visiting forecast. The number of follower for non-visiting forecast is then 
computed in the same way. ln_change measures the change in the number of 
followers for visiting analysts and is computed as the log transformation of one plus 
the number of followers for the visiting forecast minus the log transformation of one 
plus the number of followers for the non-visiting forecast. d_change is another 
measure of the change in the number of followers for visiting analysts and is a 
dummy variable that equals to 1 if the number of followers for the visiting forecast is 
larger than the number of followers for the non-visiting forecast and equals to 0 
otherwise. accuracy_change measures the informativeness of the visiting forecast 
and is computed as the absolute value of forecast error of the visiting forecast minus 
the forecast error of the non-visiting forecast, scaled by the stock price at the 
beginning of the year. firm_exp measures analyst’s firm specific experience and is 
computed as the number of years between an analyst’s first forecast for firm i and 
his/her current forecast for firm i. star_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one 
if the analyst is ranked as the star analyst by the New Fortune magazine in the 
previous year. broker_size measures the size of the brokerage firm and is computed 
as the number of analysts working for the brokers. ana_firm_coverage is computed 
as the number of firms analyst is assigned to follow. revenue_growth measures the 
revenue growth of the firm and is computed as the revenue in year t divided by the 
revenue in year t-1. loss_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one if the net 
income is negative in year t, and 0 otherwise. tangibility measures the tangibility of 
the firm and is computed as the ratio of PP&E over total assets. manu_dummy is a 
dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is a manufacturing firm, and 0 
otherwise. b2m is the book-to-market ratio and is computed as the book value of 
equity divided by the market value of equity. mkv is the firm size and is computed as 
the log transformation of the market value of equity of firm. The t-statistics 
computed are reported in parentheses. In Panel A, *** denotes significance at the 
0.01 level. 
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Table 3 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel A: The number of follower for visiting and non-visiting forecast 
Variables 
 
Obs Mean 
    Number of follower for visiting forecast 
 
1490 2.4389 
Number of follower for non-visiting forecast 
 
1490 1.5134 
    Visiting – Non-visiting 
 
1490 0.9255*** 
   
(9.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Variables for analyses 
Variables 
 
Obs Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
d_change 
 
1490 0.5128 1 0.5000 0 1 
ln_change 
 
1490 0.3165 0.2877 0.9440 -2.8332 2.8904 
accuracy_change 
 
1490 0.0011 0 0.0200 -0.0898 0.3951 
firm_exp 
 
1490 1.8114 1 1.156059 1 9 
star_dummy 
 
1490 0.1940 0 0.3955 0 1 
broker_size 
 
1490 44.4409 42 21.6256 2 105 
ana_firm_coverage 
 
1490 23.2161 17 21.5861 1 179 
revenue_growth 
 
1289 12.9189 1.2368 414.5362 0.2411 14884.06 
loss_dummy 
 
1490 0.0107 0 0.1031 0 1 
tangibility 
 
1490 0.2069 0.1628 0.1603 0.0006 0.8494 
manu_dummy 
 
1490 0.6 1 0.4901 0 1 
b2m 
 
1490 0.2989 0.2317 0.2620 -0.0181 2.1923 
mkv 
 
1490 15.7132 15.5655 0.9958 13.3421 18.6942 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
75 
 
Table 4: The change in the number of followers for visiting analysts 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the change in the number of 
followers for visiting analysts on analyst and firm characteristics. The t-statistics 
computed are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
ln_change = α + β1accuracy_change +  β2firm_exp +  β3star_dummy + β4broker_szie +
β4ana_firm_coverage + β5Revenue_growth + β6loss_dummy + β7tangibility +
β8manu_dummy + β9b2m + β10mkv + ε                                     (1) 
                                                                                  
 
 
d_change = α + β1accuracy_change +  β2firm_exp +  β3star_dummy + β4broker_szie +
β4ana_firm_coverage + β5Revenue_growth + β6loss_dummy + β7tangibility +
β8manu_dummy + β9b2m + β10mkv + ε                                     (2) 
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Table 4 (Cont’d) 
 
Variables 
ln_change 
 
d_change 
(1) 
 
(2) 
    
accuracy_change 2.6394** 
 
2.2855*** 
 
(1.97) 
 
(3.23) 
firm_exp 0.0652*** 
 
0.0116 
 
(2.66) 
 
(0.89) 
star_dummy 0.0295 
 
0.0321 
 
(0.41) 
 
(0.84) 
broker_size 0.0003 
 
0.0005 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.69) 
ana_firm_coverage 0.0003 
 
0.0003 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.40) 
revenue_growth -0.0001 
 
-0.0000 
 
(-1.54) 
 
(-1.04) 
loss_dummy 0.1109 
 
-0.0846 
 
(0.43) 
 
(-0.61) 
tangibility -0.1468 
 
0.0525 
 
(-0.72) 
 
(0.48) 
manu_dummy 0.2141 
 
0.1409 
 
(0.93) 
 
(1.15) 
b2m -0.1734 
 
-0.1526** 
 
(-1.41) 
 
(-2.34) 
mkv -0.0386 
 
0.0184 
 
(-1.20) 
 
(1.08) 
constant 0.8405 
 
0.1584 
 
(1.39) 
 
(0.49) 
Industry fixed effect Yes 
 
Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes 
 
Yes 
    
Observations 1,271 
 
1,271 
Adj. R2 0.012 
 
0.013 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics on the influence of visiting forecasts on following 
forecasts 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for 1,526 visiting analyst observations from 
2007 to 2013. I restrict the sample to visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30 
days after the visiting event. Following forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued 
within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast. I further require the 
follower to issue a forecast during the 6 months prior to the following forecast. 
Non-visiting forecast is identified as the visiting analyst’s most recent forecast 
regarding the same firm during the 6 months prior to the visiting forecast. Following 
forecasts are identified in the same way. Gap is defined as the difference between the 
visiting analyst’s forecast and the followers’ prior forecast. Revision is defined as the 
difference between following analyst’s forecast and his/her most recent prior forecast. 
gap_closed is defined as Revision/Gap, and is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
accuracy_change measures the informativeness of the visiting forecast and is 
computed as the absolute value of forecast error of the visiting forecast minus the 
forecast error of the non-visiting forecast, scaled by the stock price at the beginning 
of the year. horizon_change measures the difference in forecasting horizon and is 
computed as the log transformation of the difference in following analyst’s two 
forecasts. firm_exp measures analyst’s firm specific experience and is computed as 
the number of years between an analyst’s first forecast for firm i and his/her current 
forecast for firm i. star_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one if the analyst 
is ranked as the star analyst by the New Fortune magazine in the previous year. 
broker_size measures the size of the brokerage firm and is computed as the number 
of analysts working for the brokers. ana_firm_coverage is computed as the number 
of firms analyst is assigned to follow. revenue_growth measures the revenue growth 
of the firm and is computed as the revenue in year t divided by the revenue in year 
t-1. loss_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one if the net income is negative 
in year t, and 0 otherwise. tangibility measures the tangibility of the firm and is 
computed as the ratio of PP&E over total assets. manu_dummy is a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the firm is a manufacturing firm, and 0 otherwise. b2m is the 
book-to-market ratio and is computed as the book value of equity divided by the 
market value of equity. mkv is the firm size and is computed as the log 
transformation of the market value of equity of firm. The t-statistics computed are 
reported in parentheses. In Panel A, *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 5 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Panel A: The influence of visiting analyst 
Variables 
 
Obs Mean 
    gap_closed (visiting forecast) 
 
1526 0.5588*** 
  (9.19) 
    
gap_closed (non-visiting forecast) 
 
538 0.3319** 
   
(1.93) 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Variables for analyses 
Variables 
 
Obs Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
gap_closed 
 
1526 0.5588 0.3333 2.0035 -11.0000 11.0000 
accuracy_change 
 
1526 -0.0023 0 0.0058 -0.0341 0.0197 
horizon_change 
 
1526 -0.6339 -0.4413 0.5793 -4.1431 -0.0473 
firm_exp 
 
1526 1.9561 2 1.2850 1 9 
star_dummy 
 
1526 0.2195 0 0.4141 0 1 
broker_size 
 
1526 46.8198 44 20.7944 6 105 
ana_firm_coverage 
 
1526 22.5741 17 20.7424 1 179 
revenue_growthh 
 
1348 1.3013 1.2435 0.4334 0.4823 7.4592 
loss_dummy 
 
1526 0.0079 0 0.0884 0 1 
tangibility 
 
1526 0.1968 0.1712296 0.1426 0.0008 0.7722 
manu_dummy 
 
1526 0.5682 1 0.4955 0 1 
b2m 
 
1526 0.2531 0.2085 0.2050 -0.018 1.978 
mkv  1526 16.1281 15.9903 1.0676 13.6690 18.6942 
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Table 6: The influence of visiting forecasts on following forecasts 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the influence of vising forecasts. 
The dependent variable is gap_closed, which is defined in Table 3. interval is defined 
as the difference between the date of the visiting analyst’s forecast and the date of the 
following analyst’s forecast. interval2 is the squared term of interval while interval3 
is the quadratic term of interval. The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
gap_closed = α + β1interval +  β2interval
2 +  β3interval
3 + ε 
 
 
Without the influence of visiting 
forecast 
With the influence of visiting 
forecast 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
interval -0.0126 0.0051 -0.0110 0.0541 
 
(-0.72) (0.03) (-1.61) (0.82) 
interval2 
 
0.0006 
 
-0.0058 
  
(0.04) 
 
(-1.04) 
interval3 
 
-0.0000 
 
0.0001 
  
(-0.15) 
 
(1.04) 
constant 0.4600* 0.3836 0.6602*** 0.5417*** 
 
(1.88) (0.99) (6.29) (3.12) 
Observations 538 538 1,526 1,526 
Adj. R2 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.000 
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Table 7: The influence of characteristics of visiting analysts on following 
forecasts 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the influence of vising forecasts on 
visiting analyst and firm characteristics. The t-statistics computed are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
gap_closed = α + β1accuracy_change + β2horizon_change +  β3firm_exp +
 β4star_dummy + β5broker_szie + β6ana_firm_coverage + β7Revenue_growth +
β8loss_dummy + β9tangibility + β10manu_dummy + β11b2m + β12mkv + ε                                            
 
Variables (1) 
 
(2) 
accuracy_change -0.2170**  -0.2396** 
 
(-2.46) 
 
(-2.42) 
horizon_change 
  
-0.0936 
   
(-0.95) 
firm_exp 
  
-0.0001 
   
(-0.00) 
star_dummy 
  
-0.0110 
   
(-0.07) 
broker_size 
  
0.0063** 
   
(2.13) 
ana_firm_coverage 
  
0.0038 
   
(1.35) 
revenue_growth 
  
-0.0065 
   
(-0.05) 
loss_dummy 
  
0.2116 
   
(0.31) 
tangibility 
  
0.0279 
   
(0.06) 
manu_dummy 
  
-0.9977 
   
(-1.61) 
b2m 
  
-0.2888 
   
(-0.89) 
mkv 
  
0.0825 
   
(1.32) 
constant 0.4566*** 
 
0.5128 
 
(8.29) 
 
(0.39) 
Industry fixed effect No 
 
Yes 
Year fixed effect No 
 
Yes 
    
observations 1,526 
 
1,344 
Adj. R2 0.003  0.023 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics on accuracy change of followers and non-followers 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for 3,483 analyst observations from 2007 to 
2013. I restrict the sample to visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30 days after 
the visiting event. Following forecasts of the visiting forecasts are identified as the 
forecasts issued within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast. Following 
forecasts of the non-visiting forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued during 30 
days before the issuance of the visiting forecasts. I further require followers of the 
visiting forecasts and followers of the non-visiting forecasts to issue at least one 
forecast regarding the same firm during 6 months prior to the current following 
forecast. ∆accuracy measures the change in forecast error and is computed as the 
absolute difference between forecast error of analyst i and his forecast during 6 
months prior to the current forecast, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the 
year for a given firm and fiscal year. follower_visit is a dummy variable that equals 
to on is the forecast is identified as a following forecast of visiting forecast, and 0 
otherwise. accuracy_change measures the informativeness of the visiting forecast 
and is computed as the absolute value of forecast error of the visiting forecast minus 
the forecast error of the non-visiting forecast, scaled by the stock price at the 
beginning of the year. horizon_change measures the difference in forecasting horizon 
and is computed as the log transformation of the difference in analyst i ’s two 
forecasts. firm_exp measures analyst’s firm specific experience and is computed as 
the number of years between an analyst’s first forecast for firm i and his/her current 
forecast for firm i. star_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one if the analyst 
is ranked as the star analyst by the New Fortune magazine in the previous year. 
broker_size measures the size of the brokerage firm and is computed as the number 
of analysts working for the brokers. ana_firm_coverage is computed as the number 
of firms analyst is assigned to follow. revenue_growth measures the revenue growth 
of the firm and is computed as the revenue in year t divided by the revenue in year 
t-1. loss_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one if the net income is negative 
in year t, and 0 otherwise. tangibility measures the tangibility of the firm and is 
computed as the ratio of PP&E over total assets. manu_dummy is a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the firm is a manufacturing firm, and 0 otherwise. b2m is the 
book-to-market ratio and is computed as the book value of equity divided by the 
market value of equity. mkv is the firm size and is computed as the log 
transformation of the market value of equity of firm. accuracy_change_d is the 
interaction term of error_change and follower_visit. firm_exp_d is the interaction 
term of firm_exp and follower_visit. star_dummy_d is the interaction term of 
star_dummy and follower_visit. broker_size_d is the interaction term of broker_size 
and follower_visit. ana_firm_coverage is the interaction term of ana_firm_coverage 
and follower_visit. revenue_growth_d is the interaction term of revenue_growth and 
follower_visit. loss_d is the interaction term of loss_dummy and follower_visit. 
tangibility_d is the interaction term of tangibility and follower_visit. manu_d is the 
interaction term of manu_dummy and follower_visit. b2m_d is the interaction term of 
b2m and follower_visit. mkv_d is the interaction term of mkv and follower_visit. The 
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t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. In Panel A, *** denotes 
significance at the 0.01 level
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Table 8 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Panel A: The change in forecast error of following and non –following forecasts 
Variables 
 
Obs Prior forecast Current forecast Difference 
   
(1) (2) (1) - (2) 
Non-following forecast of visiting forecast 
 
2261 0.0069 0.0056 0.0014*** 
    
 (14.92) 
Following forecast of visiting forecast 
 
1222 0.0078 0.0047 0.0031*** 
    (15.91) 
      
Non-following - Following 
  
-0.0009*** 0.0008*** -0.0017*** 
   
(-3.01) (3.79) (-9.03) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
84 
 
Table 8 (Cont’d) 
  
Panel B: Variables for analyses 
Variables 
 
Obs Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
∆accuracy 
 
3483 -0.0197 0 0.0540 -0.3254 0.2102 
follower_visit 
 
3483 0.3508 0 0.4773 0 1 
accuracy_change 
 
3483 -0.0018 0 0.0057 -0.0341 0.0212 
horizon_change 
 
3483 -0.3613 -0.2814 0.4954 -4.1431 0 
firm_exp 
 
3483 1.8803 1 1.2149 1 9 
star_dummy 
 
3483 0.1539 0 0.3609 0 1 
broker_size 
 
3483 41.7962 39 21.3897 2 105 
ana_firm_coverage 
 
3483 22.10 17 21.94 1 252 
revenue_growth 
 
3036 6.2070 1.2454 270.1051 0.2411 14884.0600 
loss_dummy 
 
3483 0.0043 0 0.0655 0 1 
tangibility 
 
3483 0.2017 0.1699 0.1492 0.0006 0.7722 
manu_dummy 
 
3483 0.5848 1 0.4928 0 1 
b2m  3483 0.2643 0.2120 0.2130 -0.0181 1.9782 
mkv  3483 16.0492 15.9011 1.0723 13.9130 18.6942 
  
85 
 
Table 9: Forecast accuracy change and characteristics 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the change in forecast accuracy on 
followers of visiting forecast indicator and forecast, analyst, and firm characteristics. 
The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
∆accuracy = α + β1follower_visit + β2accuracy_change + β3horizon_change +
 β4firm_exp +  β5star_dummy + β6broker_szie + β7ana_firm_coverage +
β8revenue_growth + β9loss_dummy + β10tangibility + β11manu_dummy + β12b2m +
β13mkv + ε                                                              (1) 
 
 
 
∆accuracy = α + β1follower_visit + β2accuracy_change_d +   β3firm_exp_d +
 β4star_dummy_d + β5broker_szie_d + β6ana_firm_coverage_d +
β7revenue_growth_d + β8loss_dummy_d + β9tangibility_d + β10manu_dummy_d +
β11b2m_d + β12mkv_d + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ε                                       (3)                               
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Table 9 (Cont’d) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
follower_visit -0.0110*** -0.0055** -0.0081 
 
(-5.25) (-2.57) (-0.27) 
accuracy_change_d 
 
2.9555*** 2.8020*** 
  
(9.73) (9.19) 
firm_exp_d 
  
0.0044*** 
   
(2.89) 
star_dummy_d 
  
-0.0071 
   
(-1.35) 
broker_size_d 
  
-0.0001 
   
(-0.73) 
ana_firm_coverage_d 
  
-0.0001 
   
(-1.53) 
revenue_growth_d 
  
-0.0037 
   
(-0.70) 
loss_d 
  
-0.0374 
   
(-1.43) 
tangibility_d 
  
0.0089 
   
(0.70) 
manu_d 
  
-0.0058 
   
(-1.51) 
b2m_d 
  
-0.0425*** 
   
(-4.38) 
mkv_d 
  
0.0011 
   
(0.64) 
constant 0.0401** 0.0338* 0.0416* 
 
(2.01) (1.72) (1.82) 
controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
observations 3,018 3,018 3,018 
Adj. R2 0.208 0.232 0.241 
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Table 10: Probit estimate of the probability of issuing a following forecast 
 
This table presents the probit estimate of the probability of being a follower on 
different forecast, analyst, and firm characteristics. treated is a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the forecast is identified as a following forecast of visiting forecast, 
and 0 otherwise. freq_follower is a dummy variable that equals to one if the number 
of following forecast an analyst issued in that year is larger than or equals to the 
mean number of following forecast issued by all analysts. Other variables are defined 
in the same way as above. The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
treated = α + β1accuracy_change +  β2horizon_change +  β3firm_exp +
 β4star_dummy + β5broker_szie + β6ana_firm_coverage + β7Revenue_growth +
β8loss_dummy + β9tangibility + β10manu_dummy + β11b2m + β12mkv +
β13freq_follower + ε                                            
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Table 10 (cont’d) 
 
Variables 
Coeff. 
(t-value) 
accuracy_change 0.5034 
 
(0.11) 
horizon_change -1.9723*** 
 
(-23.58) 
firm_exp 0.0199 
 
(0.86) 
star_dummy -0.0648 
 
(-0.83) 
broker_size 0.0020 
 
(1.41) 
ana_firm_coverage -0.0017 
 
(-1.27) 
revenue_growth -0.3725*** 
 
(-3.90) 
loss_dummy 0.4376 
 
(1.06) 
tangibility 0.5575** 
 
(2.51) 
manu_dummy 0.6133** 
 
(2.06) 
b2m -0.2744* 
 
(-1.71) 
mkv 0.0521* 
 
(1.76) 
freq_follower 0.3963*** 
 
(6.78) 
constant -2.5431*** 
 
(-3.97) 
Industry fixed effect Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes 
  
observations 3,018 
Adj. R2 0.254 
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Table 11: Regression after sample selection correction 
 
This table presents OLS regression results of the change in forecast accuracy on 
different forecast, analyst, and firm characteristics. lambda is the inverse mills ratio 
from Table 5. Other variables are defined in the same way as above. The t-statistics 
computed are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
∆accuracy = α + β1follower_visit + β2accuracy_change + β3horizon_change +
 β4firm_exp +  β5star_dummy + β6broker_szie + β7ana_firm_coverage +
β8revenue_growth + β9loss_dummy + β10tangibility + β11manu_dummy + β12b2m +
β13mkv + ε                                                              (1) 
                                                                         
 
∆accuracy = α + β1follower_visit + β2accuracy_change + β3horizon_change +
 β4firm_exp +  β5star_dummy + β6broker_szie + β7ana_firm_coverage +
β8revenue_growth + β9loss_dummy + β10tangibility + β11manu_dummy + β12b2m +
β13mkv + β14lambda + ε                                              (2) 
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Table 11 (Cont’d) 
 
Variables (1) 
 
(2) 
    
accuracy_change 5.0147***  5.0193*** 
 
(16.83) 
 
(16.85) 
horizon_change 0.0068** 
 
0.0034 
 
(2.36) 
 
(0.72) 
firm_exp 0.0048*** 
 
0.0050*** 
 
(3.19) 
 
(3.25) 
star_dummy -0.0128** 
 
-0.0127** 
 
(-2.44) 
 
(-2.43) 
broker_size -0.0000 
 
-0.0000 
 
(-0.35) 
 
(-0.26) 
ana_firm_coverage -0.0001 
 
-0.0001 
 
(-1.13) 
 
(-1.15) 
revenue_growth -0.0063 
 
-0.0082 
 
(-0.95) 
 
(-1.18) 
loss_dummy -0.0328 
 
-0.0316 
 
(-1.37) 
 
(-1.32) 
tangibility 0.0004 
 
0.0009 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.06) 
manu_dummy 0.0096 
 
0.0102 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.40) 
b2m -0.0610*** 
 
-0.0625*** 
 
(-5.69) 
 
(-5.76) 
mkv -0.0015 
 
-0.0014 
 
(-0.74) 
 
(-0.67) 
lambda 
  
0.0068 
   
(0.90) 
constant 0.0221 
 
0.0139 
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.30) 
    
Industry fixed effect Yes 
 
Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes 
observations 1,051  1,051 
Adj. R2 0.292  0.292 
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Table 12: Change in forecast dispersion 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for 1,326 firm observations in Panel A and 
361 firm observations in Panel B both from 2007 to 2013. I restrict the sample to 
visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30 days after the visiting event. Dispersion 
is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts’ current-fiscal-year annual 
earnings per share forecasts to the absolute value of the mean forecasts. disp_after 
refers to the dispersion of forecasts within 30 days after the visiting forecasts (group 
1 in Figure 4) while disp_before refers to the dispersion of forecasts during 30 days 
prior to the visiting forecast (group 2 in Figure 4). I further require there are at least 
two forecasts in both periods in order to compute dispersion. In panel B, dispersions 
are computed using the same time period but with regard to visiting analyst’s prior 
non-visiting forecast (group 3 and 4 in Figure 4). Dispersions are winsorized at the 
10% and 90% levels. The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. *** 
denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
  
Panel A: Change in firm level dispersion for visiting analyst’s visiting forecast 
Variables 
 
Obs Mean 
    disp_before 
 
1,326 0.0699 
disp_after 
 
1,326 0.0648 
    Before - After 
  
0.0051*** 
   
(2.31) 
 
 
Panel B: Change in firm level dispersion for visiting analyst’s prior non-visiting 
forecast 
Variables 
 
Obs Mean 
    disp_before 
 
361 0.0644 
disp_after 
 
361 0.0623 
    Before - After 
  
0.0021 
   
(0.59) 
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Table 13: Change in common information and private information 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for 1,313 firm observations in Panel A and 360 firm observations in Panel B both from 2007 to 2013. I 
restrict the sample to visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30 days after the visiting event. common_after is computed by using forecasts 
within 30 days after the visiting forecasts (group 1 in Figure 4) while common_before is computed by using forecasts during 30 days prior to the 
visiting forecast (group 2 in Figure 4). private_after and private_after are computed by using the same sample respectively. I further require there 
are at least two forecasts in both periods in order to compute the variance of forecast. In panel B, variables are computed using the same time 
period but with regard to visiting analyst’s prior non-visiting forecast (group 3 and 4 in Figure 4). All variables are winsorized at the 10% and 90% 
levels. The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
common  =   
(SE−
𝐷
𝑁
)
[(1−
1
𝑁
)𝐷+𝑆𝐸]2
  ,     private  =   
D
[(1−
1
𝑁
)𝐷+𝑆𝐸]2
 
Where N is the number of analysts’ forecasts. D is the variance of the analysts’ forecasts. SE is the squared error in the mean forecast, computed 
as the squared difference between the mean forecasted EPS and actual EPS i.e.(Mean forecasted EPS – Actual EPS)2.  
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Table 13 (cont’d) 
 
 
Panel A: Change in common and private information for visiting analyst’s visiting forecast 
Variables Obs Mean  Obs Mean 
   
   
common_before 1,313 106.93 private_before 1,313 165.16 
common_after 1,313 123.10  private_after 1,313 161.72 
   
   
Before - After 
 
-16.17*** Before - After  -3.43 
  
(-2.65)   (-0.31) 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Change in common and private information for visiting analyst’s non-visiting forecast 
Variables Obs Mean  Obs Mean 
   
   
common_before 360 99.66 private_before 360 194.44 
common_after 360 113.34 private_after 360 186.61 
   
   
Before - After 
 
-13.68 Before - After  7.83 
  
(-1.30)   (0.33) 
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Table 14: Change in forecast error of consensus forecast 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for 2,935 firm observations from 2007 to 2013. 
I restrict the sample to visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30 days after the 
visiting event. Following forecasts of the visiting forecasts are identified as the 
forecasts issued within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast. Following 
forecasts of the non-visiting forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued during 30 
days before the issuance of the visiting forecasts. I further require there is at least one 
forecast in both the prior and post period of visiting forecast. consensus_before is 
computed by using forecasts issued 30 days before the visiting forecast, and is 
defined as the absolute difference between the consensus EPS forecast and actual 
EPS, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year. consensus_after is 
computed by using forecasts issued 30 days after the visiting forecast, and is defined 
as the absolute difference between the consensus EPS forecast and actual EPS, scaled 
by the stock price at the beginning of the year. Variables are winsorized at the 10% 
and 90% levels. The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. ** denotes 
significance at the 0.05 level. 
 
  
Panel A: Forecast error change of consensus forecast (visiting forecast) 
Variables 
 
Obs Mean 
    consensus_before 
 
2,935 0.0077 
consensus_after 
 
2,935 0.0073 
    Before - After 
  
0.0004** 
   
(2.27) 
 
 
Panel B: Forecast error change of consensus forecast (non-visiting forecast) 
Variables 
 
Obs Mean 
    consensus_before 
 
490 0.0059 
consensus_after 
 
490 0.0058 
    Before - After 
  
0.0001 
   
(0.34) 
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Table 15: Difference in forecast accuracy between visiting forecasts and prior consensus forecasts 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for 3,832 visiting forecast observations from 2007 to 2013. I restrict the sample to visiting analysts’ 
forecasts issued within 30 days after the visiting event. Only the first visiting forecast is kept if the site visit is conducted by multiple analysts. I 
further require there is at least one forecast in the month prior to the visiting forecast in order to compute the consensus forecast. The prior 
consensus forecast is defined as the mean EPS forecast in the month prior to the visiting forecast. consensus_fe is computed as the absolute 
difference between the consensus EPS forecast and actual EPS, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year. visiting_fe is computed as 
the absolute difference between the visiting EPS forecast and actual EPS, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year. The t-statistics 
computed are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
  
 
 
Variables 
 
Obs Mean 
    consensus_fe 
 
3,832 0.0101 
visiting_fe 
 
3,832 0.0093 
    consensus - visiting 
  
0.0008*** 
   
(4.82) 
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